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Abstract 
Since the early 1990s the European Community has sought to make the protection of 
human rights and democracy an essential condition of its cooperation (both 
developmental and economic) with third states. This action combines economic and 
political objectives in a manner which pushes the boundaries of Community competence 
to its limits, both internally and externally. 
This thesis examines first the development of human rights in the international legal 
system, to establish the legitimacy of any international actor to take such action. It also 
examines the extent to which the international legal order has developed to 
accommodate a non-state actor such as the Community. 
Then, once these wider questions have been considered, the thesis focuses on the 
internal aspects. The development of human rights within the Community and the 
developing concern over human rights violations in third states are examined. The 
definitions of "human rights" in each context are compared. Finally, it examines the 
operation of the policy, with particular reference to the experiences in the negotiations 
with Australia and Mexico. 
No attempt is made to judge the morality of this policy, the question throughout is 
whether the Community possesses the competence to pursue these aims, and whether 
the legal mechanism chosen is appropriate to the pursuit of these aims. Ultimately it 
concludes that the universal approach adopted lays the Community open to unwarranted 
criticism. The Community is attempting to achieve greater consistency and 
transparency in the operation of this policy: it is submitted that this does not require a 
uniform mechanism. The Community should recognise, both in the expression of the 
policy itself, and in the expression of the rights to be protected, the differences that 
warrant different implementation in different cases. 
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Introduction 
The Emergence of the Human Rights and Democracy Clause in Agreements 
Between the European Community and Third States 
Introduction 
In 1990 the European Community1 entered a new phase in its external relations, in which 
it now endeavours to include a basic "human rights and democracy" clause in every 
international agreement it concludes. 
This clause first manifested itself in the context of development cooperation, in Article 5 
Lome IV. 2 Prior to this, human rights had been referred to in the preambles of 
development cooperation agreements but did not find expression in the treaties 
themselves, due to the intrinsic political sensitivity surrounding them. The Community 
had sought to incorporate such a clause as early as Lome I I (as a reaction to the situation 
in which it found itself, having to continue payments to states grossly violating human 
rights).3 However the partner states were suspicious of both perceived political 
intervention, and the differing interpretations which may be given to human rights.4 
Since its inclusion in Lome IV however, the human rights clause has become generalised, 
and since 19925 it has formed an essential element of the Community's international 
agreements. Commissioner Marin stated in 1993 that "very explicit clauses on human 
1 Hereafter Community or E C . 
2 OJ 1991 L229/1. 
3 See Rene J.H. Smits, "The Second Lome Convention: an assessment with special reference to human 
rights" 1980/2 LIEI . 
4 See Cremona, "Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC's Trade Agreements " Emiliou and 
O'Keefe 1996, or (1995) Law and Justice; Kuyper, Pieter Jan "Trade Sanctions, Security and Human 
Rights" in Maresceau; TJlimubenshi, Pierre-Celestin "Laproblemmatique de la clause des droits del'home 
dans un accord de co-operation economiqe.l'example de la Convention de Lome" (1994) AJICL 253. 
5 See, for example, agreements with Brazil; OJ 1992 CI63; the Baltic States OJ 1992 L403; Albania OJ 
1992 L343; the Andean Pact countries OJ 1993 C25. 
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rights and basic freedoms are now an integral part of all agreements concluded by the 
Community with non-member countries."6 
The body of Commission Communication (95) 216 makes it clear that the reference point 
for human rights (for example the Helsinki Agreement) should be selected according to 
circumstances.7 The framework agreement with Korea, thus refers to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Whichever the terms of reference, this clause is 
accompanied by a complementary clause concerning its potential breach which can take 
two forms: either that of explicit suspension (the "Baltic" clause) or a general non-
execution ("Bulgarian") clause.8 Either party therefore may suspend or vary the 
operation of the agreement i f a violation of human rights or democracy occurs. 
The non-discriminatory approach, which stipulates inclusion of the clause in some form 
in every agreement (association and economic cooperation), was adopted in 1993.9 
Nevertheless in its assessment in 1995 the Commission observes that "although 
Commission guidelines [on the inclusion of these clauses] have been respected, the 
objectives of a systematic approach have not yet been achieved." It concludes "that there 
is a need ... to improve the consistency, transparency and visibility of the Community 
approach and to make greater allowance for the sensitivity of third countries."10 
It should be noted however, having regard to the sensitivity of other countries, that the 
"Baltic" clause was only used in agreements with the Baltic States, Albania and Slovenia. 
The, less extreme, "Bulgarian" clause, has been used more frequently. Even the more 
conciliatory approach has encountered problems however. The generalisation away from 
a purely development cooperation context, to include such a clause indiscriminately, has 
varying effects and implications. Its attempted inclusion in the EC's trade negotiations 
6 Com (95) 216. 
7 COM (95)216 final pp. 12-13. 
8 See Annex A for texts of clauses. 
9 Commission Decision of 26/1/93, MIN 93 1137 pt XIV. 
1 0 COM (95) 216 final. 
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with Australia" was perhaps not anticipated on its first application in the context of 
development cooperation. The Commission expresses the inclusion of a human rights 
clause in such a case "not as imposing a condition, but in the spirit of a joint undertaking 
to promote universal values".12 
This view expresses an intensely political agenda, raising questions concerning the basis 
of the Commission's competence in this respect. Clearly the question of Community 
competence can be resolved only with reference to the provision made for human rights 
within each of the Treaties, as well as the express external competencies with which it 
has been endowed. 
The establishment of the scope of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) was 
particularly controversial, and hard fought, with Member States jealously guarding their 
power. The new concerns of the Community raise further external questions. It appears 
that having finally determined the extent of the CCP, the Community is opening a new 
debate, concerning external relations which do not prima facie fall under the heading of 
"commercial policy". Like sanctions, the human rights and democracy clause may well 
demonstrate another instance in which foreign policy is implemented through the CCP. 
The extent to which inclusion of this clause can itself be said to be non-commercial is, 
however, far from clear. This thesis demonstrates that there are strong economic factors 
at play in the operation of this policy. However, regardless of its commercial 
implications, the intensely political agenda pursued raises the question: does such a 
common policy come within Community competence, or the Union's Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP)? 
This is a field in which it is easy to be distracted by moral judgments of the motives 
involved, however this thesis aims to maintain a purely legal analysis. No final 
" For discussion see Chapter 7. 
1 2 COM (95) 567 final. 
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judgments are reached on the policy's success, or on its morality, in anything other than 
legal terms. Thus it does not attempt to make a political judgment upon the policy. 
Part I lays the groundwork for an analysis of the Community's policy. Initially, it 
considers the development of international law which permits any kind of international 
action to protect human rights, and who the actors in this respect may be. It thereby 
establishes the basis upon which the Community may have any role in the international 
legal order. Secondly, it establishes the competence of the Community, as an actor in the 
international legal order, to play the role it has adopted for itself with this policy. As an 
essential element of this it examines the development of the CFSP framework, assessing 
the role of the Community from the internal, European Union perspective. 
Part I I assesses the internal aspects of Community competence to protect human rights. 
Although the development of this competence has provoked a great deal of academic 
comment, it is essential to explore it in analysis of the emergence of human rights in the 
Community's external relations. This exploration considers first the Treaties. It 
continues by examining the relationship between the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Community, and the role of the European Court of Justice in both the 
establishment of this relationship, and in the development of protection of human rights 
as a matter of Community concern. It then considers whether this has given rise to a 
parallel, external power in relation to human rights. It should be noted at this point that 
although the clause refers to both human rights and democratic principles, this thesis 
focuses, in its assessment of the clause, on the Community competence in relation to 
human rights. 
Finally, Part I I I examines the practical experience of the Community in the 
implementation of this policy, focussing in particular on case studies relating to the 
Community's negotiations with both Australia and Mexico, in each of which the 
inclusion of the human rights clause proved to be problematic. It is in this section that 
the ambiguities caused by the lack of effective definition of "human rights" in this field, 
become evident. 
4 
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Part 1: Human Rights and the European Community in the International Legal 
Order 
Introduction 
Examination of the human rights and democracy clause in the European Community's13 
agreements is complicated because many of the relevant issues are interrelated, to 
establish one particular aspect becomes very difficult without making assumptions about 
the others. It is submitted, however, that before assessing any aspect of this Community 
policy, it is first necessary to understand the potential for any international actor to 
invoke such a policy. I f no actor can legitimately do so, further questions as to 
Community (or European Union1 4) competence, internal or external, become 
unnecessary. Therefore before embarking on a study of how the Community should act 
(or indeed whether it is competent to) in the sphere of development and protection of 
human rights outwith its internal jurisdiction, it is essential to consider whether these 
rights, relating as they do to individuals, have developed sufficiently to override the 
founding purpose of international law, the protection and regulation of the affairs of 
states. Accompanying this primary question is the issue of whether, in an international 
order created by and revolving around the sovereign state, an organisation such as the EU 
(or any of its constituent pillars) can have any independent international role. Similarly, 
it is irrelevant whether or not the Member States have endowed the Community or Union 
with the necessary competence i f it is not theirs to give. I f international law denies the 
possibility of action in this field the member states cannot confer such competence on an 
international organisation, whatever its unique status. Thus, before assessing the 
potential role of the EU in this sphere, and how this can best be fulfilled, it is essential to 
establish the status of these foundations of international law. 
Part I therefore establishes first the competence of any legal person, state or other, to take 
action in relation to the protection of human rights and democracy, and the scope of this 
1 3 Hereafter E C or Community. 
1 4 Hereafter E U or Union. 
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competence where it comes into conflict with other, traditional, principles of international 
law. It then examines whether the Community has been given the competence to develop 
this policy. 
6 
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Chapter 1: The Development of Human Rights in International Law 
International law developed to protect and regulate the affairs of states. Clearly, 
therefore, the development of the international concept of human rights has had a 
considerable impact upon the manner in which fundamental principles are now 
considered. 
Traditional Position: The Protection of the Individual Sovereign State. 
The protection of the sovereign state was traditionally guaranteed under international law 
by the concept of domestic jurisdiction and the operation of the principle of non-
intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state.15 The internal affairs of a state were a 
matter exclusively for its own domestic jurisdiction and could not be interfered with by 
other states. Unless international law has developed sufficiently to override these 
traditional tenets, the individual Member States of the Umon/Community would be 
unable to take any action to protect human rights in another state. 
Oppenheim classically defined intervention as: 
"dictatorial interference by a state in the affairs of another State for the purpose of 
maintaining or altering the actual condition of things. "'6 
While "dictatorial interference" would be an extreme description, the aim, of maintaining 
* 
or altering the actual condition of things, is clearly applicable to the Community's 
inclusion of human rights and democracy clauses in its international trade agreements. I f 
the Community's conduct can thus be interpreted as intervention, does it contravene the 
principle of non-intervention? The response to this is not as straightforward as initially 
appears. 
1 5 See Dominic McGoldrick: "The principle of non-intervention: human rights " p.85 et seq. on the close 
link between these. 
1 6 H, Lauterpacht (ed.) "Oppenheim's International Law". 
1 
Human Rights and the European Community in the International Legal Order 
Examination of the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJyinternational Court of Justice (ICJ) can aid in the identification of what may or 
may not contravene the rule of non-intervention (or constitute a breach of domestic 
jurisdiction). The Nicaragua Case11 deals expressly with this principle. Here the Court 
stated that this principle is tied up in the right of every sovereign nation to conduct its 
own internal affairs and that this is a corollary of the principle of sovereign equality of 
states. While observing that violations of the principle are not infrequent, the Court 
maintained that the principle is "part and parcel" of Customary International Law. The 
Court then concluded that: 
"..A prohibited intervention must accordingly be one bearing on matters which 
each state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty to decide freely. One 
of these is the choice of a political, economic, social and cultural system and the 
formulation of foreign policy. Intervention is wrongful when it uses measures of 
coercion in regard to such choices which must remain free ones. The element of 
coercion which defines and indeed forms the very essence of prohibited 
intervention is particularly obvious in the case of intervention which uses force."18 
Thus it is coercion which is decisive in establishing wrongful intervention. Those 
obligations a state undertakes freely are binding upon it, even i f they relate to what 
previously was within its domestic jurisdiction. The enforcement of these obligations 
however, may well involve "intervention". In this respect the Court stated: 
"Where human rights are protected by international conventions, that protection 
takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring respect for human 
rights as are provided for in the Convention themselves."19 
17 Case Concerning Military and Para-military activities In and Against Nicaragua [1986] ICJ Rep 14 at 
para. 202 et seq. 
18 Ibid. para. 205. 
19 Supra note 18, para. 267. 
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This indicates that obligations will be enforceable by means of intervention, as stipulated 
and agreed in the Convention. However, i f none is specified, no intervention wil l be 
permissible. 
With regard to domestic jurisdiction, the PCIJ stated in the Nationality Decrees Advisory 
Opinion2 0 that while the question of whether a matter is solely within the jurisdiction of a 
state is a relative one, dependent upon the development of international relations: "the 
right of a state to use its discretion is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may 
have undertaken towards other states."21 It then draws this to its natural conclusion that: 
"jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to a state, is limited by the rules of 
international law." 
The conclusion drawn from the International Court's jurisprudence in relation to these 
classic principles of international law, is that states may curtail their sovereignty but only 
freely. Where they have done so there is no infringement of the principle of non-
intervention in the event that agreed enforcement measures are utilised. Without a 
specific enforcement clause however, the Vienna Convention22 allows a "fundamental 
change of circumstances" to be invoked to suspend or terminate an international 
convention if, and only if, the change concerned an essential element of the agreement, or 
its effect radically transforms the extent of the obligations. 
Generally, however, any action in this field requires two stages: the setting of standards, 
and reaching agreement on the enforcement measures to be used. The Community has 
selected "universal standards of human rights" as those to be upheld in its agreements. 
Furthermore, it has established an enforcement mechanism: that it wil l suspend the 
relevant agreement in the event of non-compliance with these standards. Thus it would 
20 Nationality decrees issued in Tunis and Morocco (1923) P.C.I. J. Rep. Series B, No.4, 27; World Court 
Reports, Hudson, Vol.1 1922-26, pp.143-162. 
2 1 At p. 156 (Hudson). 
2 2 Article 62. 
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appear that the Community is acting legitimately and transparently in the implementation 
of this policy. 
There are, however, certain questions which arise. First, the agreement of parties (or 
absence of coercion) is a key factor; therefore the implication which may be drawn from 
the relative bargaining strengths of the parties involved must be considered. I f one party 
is markedly stronger than another, can the weaker state be presumed to have freely 
accepted the stronger state's standards? Second, the lack of specification as to which 
"universal human rights" the Community is concerned with, has caused unnecessary 
problems. Thirdly, although there is a "non-execution" clause, there is no mechanism by 
which either party can be compelled to bring it into effect. Therefore there is no 
guarantee of either uniformity or transparency in relation to the enforcement of this 
policy. 
The Development of Internationally Recognised Human Rights 
The development of international human rights law marks a watershed in the scope of 
international law, which traditionally had no bearing upon individuals' rights. Against 
this background, no assumptions can be made about the validity of citing human rights as 
justification for an action which is perceived to encroach upon the domestic jurisdiction 
of another state. 
The PCIJ failed, in the Nationality Decrees Advisory Opinion21, to specify which 
circumstances may bring a matter irrevocably into international law. It is possible to 
argue however that the development of human rights obligations (in both treaty and 
custom) brings this matter outside the realm of the individual state and into that of 
international law. To substantiate this requires the establishment of the extent to which 
human rights have developed as a constituent part of international law. 
Supra note 20. 
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This is consistent with the Court's statement (above) in the Nationality Decrees Advisory 
Opinion2 4 that whether a matter remains within domestic jurisdiction is a relative 
question, the answer to which is dependent upon the development of international 
relations. 
The Court's comment, that a state can limit its own discretion through its obligations 
undertaken towards other states, is explicit: where a state has given guarantees to other 
states regarding human rights, it should be bound by these guarantees, even though this 
may encroach on what was once its exclusive jurisdiction. This is not per se 
revolutionary in international law terms: the doctrine "pacta sunt servanda" is well 
established and it is an application of this doctrine which binds states with regard to what 
was once their domestic jurisdiction. 
This notwithstanding, before it can be said that human rights has moved definitively into 
the realm of international law, the true extent of commitment to human rights (the 
underlying development there has been in this field in international relations) must be 
established. To do so requires an examination of the treaty obligations relevant to this 
field, particularly the United Nations Charter (the Charter). 
Article 2(7) of the Charter deals expressly with the principle of domestic jurisdiction and 
non-intervention: "Nothing in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state..." 
how human rights can develop in international relations, depends largely upon the 
interpretation given to this provision. Brownlie states that: 
". . . the domestic jurisdiction reservation does not apply i f the United Nations 
agency is of the opinion that a breach of a specific legal obligation relating to 
human rights in the Charter itself has occurred. In practice, organs of the United 
Nations have further reduced the effect of the reservation, by construing certain 
2iSupra note 20. 
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provisions relating to human rights, which might seem only hortatory, as 
presenting definitive and active legal obligations."25 
This interpretation indicates that, in the event that a state has entered into a treaty 
obligation, (whether or not within the Charter), relating to human rights, it will not be 
able to rely on Article 2(7) to avoid external intervention. This, when viewed alongside 
the potentially wide ambit of Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter26 would seem to indicate 
that the concept of domestic jurisdiction is far weaker than it once was. 
It is now apparent that, by their adherence to the Charter, individual states have inhibited 
their sovereignty in human rights even before concluding agreements bearing upon this 
field with the Community. This itself raises the question of what ( i f any) role the Union 
(or Community) may have in the enforcement of the rights and principles of the Charter. 
Even before that its authority as an international actor must be established. Again, this is 
a matter on which recent developments in international relations and law, and the 
implications of the direction of these developments have some bearing. 
The Shift from Individual Sovereign State to Community of States 
Together, the development of new rights in international law and the erosion of 
fundamental principles, as discussed above, have profound conceptual implications. In 
the development of the law relating to the protection of human rights we are witnessing a 
2 5 Brownlie, "Principles of Public International Law" Oxford, Clarendon Press, 5th Edition, 1998, 557-
558. 
26 Art. 55 "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self 
determination of peoples the United Nations shall promote: 
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development; 
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and international 
cultural and educational co-operation; and 
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion." 
Art. 56 "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." 
12 
Human Rights and the European Community in the International Legal Order 
transformation in the basis, and function, of international law. International law has 
shifted to such an extent that the rights of individuals can now take precedence over 
traditional fundamental principles relating to the sovereignty of states. I f we consider 
this not only in relation to the principles of non-intervention and domestic jurisdiction, 
but within the global picture of international relations and law, this transformation may 
mean that although a supra-national organisation, such as the Union, traditionally had no 
independent role as an international actor, it can now fulf i l such a role. 
What has been established is a shift in emphasis in international law from protection 
exclusively of the sovereign state to protection of individuals' rights. This has been 
paralleled by a shift in organisational terms away from the sovereign state to a growing 
emphasis on supra/international organisations or institutions. These together indicate a 
declining influence of the sovereign state. 
Schreuer27 asserts that it is not the existence itself of such bodies which indicates this shift 
but rather that the conclusive factor is the transferral of what traditionally had been state 
power to them. In the light of what has been discussed above this could relate to the 
transferral of jurisdiction in relation to the protection of human rights from the state itself 
to, for example, the United Nations, through its accession to the UN Charter or similar 
international treaty. Schreuer continues: 
"To the extent that these institutions become international actors in their own 
right and exercise some measure of authority and control they must be seen as a 
new dimension in the international community."28 
This corresponds with the leading authority on the legal personality of international 
organisations: the judgment of the ICJ in the Reparations Case}9 Although there is no 
2 7 Schreuer: "The waning of the sovereign state: towards a new paradigm for international law? " 4 EJIL 
(1993) at p. 451. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Reparations for injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174. 
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explicit conferral of personality in the UN Charter the ICJ examined the content of the 
Charter, focusing in particular on the functions and organisation of the UN and on its 
relationship with the members. From the fact that the UN clearly had a position quite 
separate from that of its members and an evidently political role, the Court concluded that 
the UN must possess personality in order to fu l f i l its functions.30 
Thus it is not clear from the terms of a Treaty per se whether or not the organisation 
created is a legal person; instead, the substance must be examined. The powers granted, 
position created and relationship with member states must all be taken into consideration. 
I f these functions are such as would normally demand fulfilment by a legal person, or 
legal capacity to carry them through, this would be indicative of legal personality. 
Schreuer views the Community as being at the forefront of developments in these terms. 
It has its own independent legislature and judiciary, whose powers extend to the 
regulation of external trade. Moreover, judicial activism has carried its powers far 
beyond what was perhaps envisaged in 1957. In addition to these indicators the EC 
Treaty is, in fact, explicit that the Community shall have full legal personality.31 
This reinforces the view that a change in the role of the individual state has occurred. 
However it is important to see this not as the replacement of state power by supra-
national power but instead as the development of a co-existing power which may take 
precedence in such areas as it is practical for it to do so. Such a view requires us to adjust 
our perspective and understanding of international legal relations: adding a further 
dimension to be incorporated, rather than merely replacing one type of actor with 
another. As Schreuer observes: 
3 0 It should however be noted that the Court explicitly stated that the personality of the UN was not as 
wide-ranging as that of a State, ibid, pp 179-180. 
3 1 Article 210 states "The Community shall have legal personality", any doubts as to the extent of this 
personality are resolved by Article 211: "...the Community shall enjoy the most extensive legal capacity 
accorded to legal persons under their laws...." In contrast, the Union has not been endowed with such 
characteristics. 
14 
Human Rights and the European Community in the International Legal Order 
"under this functionalist approach what matters is not the formal status of a 
participant (province, states, international organisation) but its actual or 
preferable exercise of functions."32 
It should at this point be borne in mind however that a "community of states" (such as the 
EC) has no greater competency than that of its individual members vis-d-vis third states. 
That is, it cannot, as a supra-national organisation, take action that an individual member 
state would not be competent to take. Thus, i f the member states have attributed 
competence to, for example, the UN, the Community would have no role other than that 
given by the UN. Vis-a-vis its constituent members, it is clearly established under 
Community law that the powers of a supra-national organisation extend only so far as 
those attributed to it by the member states. Again, however, the members cannot 
attribute competency relating to third states that they do not individually posses. 
Accordingly, the full recognition and attribution of legal rights to the Community under 
Article 211 is expressly limited to "within the Member States." 
In conclusion, two things have been established thus far: first, the principles of non-
intervention and of domestic jurisdiction have been substantially weakened through the 
development of international law on human rights; secondly, the increasing influence of 
non-state actors in international law gives a community such as the EC a role to play in 
the protection of human rights, providing the necessary transferral of powers from the 
Member States has taken place. This field exemplifies the complexities of the 
interrelationship between international and both EC and EU law. 
3 2 Schreuer, supra note 27, p. 453. 
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Chapter 2: The Role and Status of the European Union in the International Legal 
Order 
It has been established above that the international legal order has changed during the 
twentieth century. While once it regulated only the affairs of sovereign states, it now 
protects the rights of individuals against those same states, and wil l allow actors other 
than states to play a role in this. It has been demonstrated that the European Community 
(Community or EC) is one of these new actors. However, there are questions outside the 
international law context which from an European perspective must be addressed. Before 
the extent of the Community's potential role as an international actor may be identified, it 
is necessary to understand the distinction between the Community and the European 
Union (EU or Union). 
Three pillars of the Union 
Difficulty arises in the confusion as to the separation of powers of the Community, from 
those that have been given to the Union. To understand this it is essential to grasp the 
structure of the Union, and the place of the Community within that overall structure. 
The "Community", in the "first" of three pillars of the Union, developed from the 
European Economic Community (EEC), and its powers remain primarily concerned with 
economic integration and smoothing the functioning of the internal market created. The 
exercise of these powers was endowed to specially created supra-national institutions. 
There was always, behind the EEC, some desire to move towards deeper political 
integration, although this has been a constant battle, well illustrated by the difficulties 
encountered in the development of Common Foreign Policy. 
The second pillar of the Union is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This 
differs from the first pillar in that the CFSP operates inter-governmentally through the 
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European Council" rather than through the institutions of the Community.34 As the 
Union has no conferred legal personality, policy developed by the Union must be 
implemented by the Community, or by the Member States collectively. Significantly, the 
Community has no power to act independently in the fields attributed to the Union, other 
than those falling under the first pillar. Thus the Community acting alone has no power 
to develop the CFSP, but must wait for prior action by the Union. 3 5 
Fundamentally, the Union is the Political umbrella. Whereas the Community may 
regulate and integrate economic matters and may enter into such agreements as are 
necessary to fu l f i l its specific, stated, aims and objectives, Foreign Policy is a separate 
pillar of the Union (a political matter, to be dealt with inter-governmentally). Thus the 
distinction between the Union and the Community is not one purely of semantics. It is 
the result of an express desire on the part of the Member States to restrict the 
Community's mandate. This desire also presumably motivated the decision of the 
Member States not to endow the Union with legal personality, although this was the 
subject of some debate at Amsterdam. Accordingly it can be safely assumed that 
divisions of competence reflect the wishes of the members. The basis of the Community 
and the Union lies in Treaty. Fundamentally, as with any other international organisation 
created by treaty, the powers of the organisation cannot exceed those given by the 
signatories. Its character cannot be other than that given. 
3 3 The European Council developed from the Hague Summit of Heads of Member States of the 
Community, held in 1969. Subsequent intergovernmental summits were to become known as the 
European Council. The European Council was formalised as the organ responsible for political co-
operation (and the subsequent development of Common Foreign Policy) in the SEA The European 
Council should not however be confused with the Council [of Ministers] which is one of the institutions of 
the European Community. Although it is possible for a meeting of the Council of Ministers to comprise 
the same members as a meeting of the European Council, these different "Councils" have different powers 
and responsibilities. Article D of the T E U provides that: "The European Council shall provide the Union 
with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political guidelines thereof." 
Article J3 illustrates the distinction in relation to foreign policy: "The council [of ministers] shall decide, 
on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, that a matter should be the subject of joint 
action." 
3 4 This notwithstanding that discussions in conjunction with the E C Council (of Ministers) were explicitly 
mentioned and the European Parliament and Commission were to be "assured of close association" and 
"fully involved" respectively. 
3 5 The CFSP, and the impact of the Amsterdam Treaty are discussed more fully below. The Third pillar, 
"Justice and Home Affairs", is not discussed as it is not of relevance here. 
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A Community of States 
To have any international role whatsoever the Union must initially establish itself clearly 
as a Community of States. The Member States have endowed the Community (the first 
pillar of the Union) with legal personality and full legal rights. They have also 
transferred competence to the Community in many fields, for example the development 
and operation of a Common Commercial Policy (CCP).36 The second and third pillars 
constitute areas in which the Member States have agreed to work together for the 
achievement of certain objectives. Thus the Member States have clearly formed a 
community which co-ordinates its policy through different mechanisms, dependent upon 
the field of action. From an external perspective however, irrespective of whether the 
States act inter-governmentally, or through the institutions of the Community, the end 
result is that there is a clear voice being expressed, representing what is a community of 
states. 
The limiting factor is the degree of power which has been transferred to the Union or 
Community. From the internal perspective, the Member States clearly envisage only the 
Community exercising any kind of active autonomous international role. In either 
circumstance the potential role of the Union or Community must remain unfulfilled in the 
absence of action within the EU or EC. 
External Powers of the Community 
The powers of the Community are limited to those conferred in the EC Treaty. The 
express powers concerning external relations are fairly limited. The European Court of 
Justice37, however, has expanded Community competence in this field through the 
doctrines of implied and parallel powers. Before briefly examining these developments, 
however, it is worth noting the express powers. 
Article 113 E C . 
Hereafter ECJ, Court of Justice, European Court or Court. 
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Express Powers 
The fundamental external powers of the Community are; first, under Article 113, the 
power to develop a Common Commercial Policy; second, under Article 130 the 
Community has the power to enter into international agreements in relation to research 
and technological development,38 protection of the environment,39 and development 
cooperation.40 Each of these powers was developed in either the Single European Act 
(SEA) or the Treaty of European Union (TEU). These powers are all exercised following 
the procedures of Article 228. The TEU also introduced the power of the Community to 
conclude international agreements in relation to monetary union.41 Third, Article 235 
empowers the Community to take appropriate measures necessary to attain one of the 
objectives of the Community.42 Finally, under Article 238, the Community can conclude 
international agreements (with either states or international organisations) establishing an 
association, and involving reciprocal rights. The power under Article 113 aroused 
vigorous debate due to the lack of specificity as to its scope: this question was 
comprehensively addressed in Opinions 1/9443 and 2/9244. 
Article 228 is clear that the power of the institutions to negotiate and conclude 
international agreements applies in the situations for which the Treaty has provided. 
Even under Article 235 the powers of the Community are limited. However, an 
expansive approach by the Court of Justice has meant that the Community has concluded 
agreements in a far wider field than the express powers may justify. 
3 8 Article 130m (Introduced in the Single European Act). 
3 9 Article 130r paragraph 4 (Single European Act). 
4 0 Article 130y (Introduced in the TEU). 
4 1 Article 109. 
4 2 Unanimity is required for any action proceeding upon this "catch all" basis. This is in contrast to the 
powers which may be exercised following the procedures of Article 228 which requires (in most cases) a 
qualified majority. This distinction proved to be of importance in Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council and 
Commission [1996] ECR 6177, [1997] CMLR 331. See Chapter 6 for discussion of this case. 
43 Opinion 1/94 Re the Uruguay Round Treaties [1995] ECR. 1-5267, [1995] 1 CMLR 205. 
44 Opinion 2/92 Re the OECD Third Revised Decision on National Treatment [1995] ECR 1-521, [1996] 2 
CMLR 325. 
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The Doctrine of Implied Powers 
The exclusive competence of the Community to act in specific fields has been outlined 
above, including the power to take such action as may be necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Community. (One may wonder then what room there is left for 
"implied powers" as any power which is implied is express, but not specific, by virtue of 
the operation of Article 235 EC.) The doctrine of implied powers was initially 
formulated in ERTA,*5 where the Court ruled that the external power of the Community 
reflects its internal power. Thus, in parallel to any internal competence, the Community 
has an implicit external competence to act in that field. Whether this competence is 
exclusive or not is dependent on whether the Community has taken action in the sphere 
internally: until it has done so the power is concurrent with the residual power of the 
Member States. However, when the Community acts upon its internal power it occupies 
the field, and the Member States lose their competence, thereby giving the Community 
exclusive competence. In Opinion 1/76 the Court stated that the Community has external 
competence without the enactment of internal measures in the relevant field, where "the 
participation of the Community in the international agreement is ... necessary for the 
attainment of one of the objectives of the Community."46 Nevertheless Opinion 1/9441 
clarified that internal legislation would be required for the Community to acquire 
exclusive competence. It also clarified that to give rise to external exclusive powers, 
attainment of the objective and the exercise of the external power must be inextricably 
linked to each other. 
In conclusion: where the Community has an express power to act in a specific field, such 
as Commercial Policy, this power is exclusive regardless of the existence of internal 
action in that field. However, where the power of the Community is implied, it becomes 
an exclusive power only upon the adoption of internal measures in that field. Whence 
therefore does the Community acquire the competence to include a human rights clause 
4 5 Case 22/70 Commission v. Council (Re ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, [1971] CMLR 335. 
46 Opinion 1/76 Re the Draft Agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway 
vessels [1977] ECR 741. 
47 Opinion 1/94 supra note 43. 
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in its international agreements? It is indisputable that in the context of development 
cooperation, the Community is competent to include respect for human rights as a 
condition of the relevant agreement. The correct legal basis for this was raised in 
Portugal v. Council.A% In relation to other fields the competence of the Community to 
take this action is more doubtful. 
The Effect of Community Law vis-a-vis the Member States 
Having accepted that the Community is competent to act internationally (albeit in 
restricted fields) and has its own independent legal system, it is necessary to establish the 
practical extent of this within the Community. The status (and effect) of Community law 
upon the Member States is a matter quite separate from the question of the status of 
Community law vis-a-vis third countries. This is exemplified by the fact that the legal 
personality conferred upon the Community operates only within the Member States. 
This is consistent with the fact that states cannot legislate outwith their own jurisdiction, 
and cannot form treaties having external effect without the participation of the relevant 
third states. The question here is: to what extent have the Member States bound 
themselves through the conclusion and ratification of the EC treaties? Conversely, what 
is the status of Community law within the Community and what effect does it have upon 
its members? 
Fundamentally, the Community's independent legal system is unique: one feature of this 
is that a variety of norms have been incorporated into the legal systems of its constituent 
states. Although the treaties refer to harmonisation of laws the greatest impact in this 
field has been achieved through the stance adopted vis-a-vis the EC Treaty by the 
European Court of Justice. 
Under the traditional law of treaties, the constitutional law of the signatory state will 
determine the domestic effect of an international treaty. In other words, a treaty per se 
has no internal, domestic effect, but is reliant upon national (constitutional) law to give it 
such. Thus, in a dualist state such as the United Kingdom, international treaties do not 
48 Supra note 42. 
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give rise to rights or interests which citizens of the state party can plead before national 
courts without implementation measures at the national level. Even i f designed for the 
protection of individuals, the provisions of international treaties bind the parties only at 
the inter-governmental level. In contrast, in a monist state, provisions of the treaty would 
require no further (implementing) measures to be enforceable by individuals. 
The EC Treaties themselves are silent as to their intended effect, which could reasonably 
have meant the traditional law of treaties would apply. However, the Court of Justice 
took a rather more purposive approach to the interpretation of their intended effect. 
The Principle of Direct Effect of Community Law 
The activism of the Court is renowned, in particular for its development of this principle, 
by which treaty provisions (and indeed other measures of the Community) may be relied 
upon by individuals before their national courts. 
It was in Van Gend en Loos49 that the Court established the groundbreaking principle of 
direct effect. The first of the questions put to the Court in this case was: 
"whether Article 12 of the EEC Treaty has direct application within the territory 
of a Member state, in other words, whether nationals of such a State can, on the 
basis of the Article in question, lay claim to individual rights which the Court must 
protect." 
to which the response of the Court was: 
"To ascertain whether the provisions of an international treaty extend so far in 
their effects it is necessary to consider the spirit, the general scheme and the 
wording of these provisions .... " 5 0 
4 9 Case 26/62, N. V. Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen[\96'i] ECR 1; [1963] CMLR 105. 
50 Ibid, p. 12. 
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Having considered the objectives of the Treaty, the terms of its preamble, and the 
creation of Community institutions limiting the sovereign right of the Member States, the 
Court went on to conclude that: 
"... the Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights albeit within limited 
fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their 
nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law 
therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to 
confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights 
arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason 
of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals 
as well as upon the member States and upon the institutions of the Community." 
The Court came to this conclusion despite submissions on behalf of the Member States to 
the effect that such direct effect had not been in the contemplation of the states when the 
treaty was negotiated and signed. 
Conditions of Direct Effect 
Within Van Gend en Loos the Court set out certain conditions which a provision of the 
Treaty must comply with in order to be directly effective. These were that it be clear, 
unconditional and that there is no discretion to be exercised by the Member States. These 
conditions in turn have benefited from a liberal interpretation by the Court in subsequent 
judgments. In Costa v. ENEL51 the Court considered separately two parts of a provision: 
Article 37(1) of the Treaty could not constitute a precise obligation on the state, merely 
imposing an obligation on the state to "progressively adjust over time". Article 37(2), in 
contrast, constituted an absolute prohibition on which the Court ruled as follows: 
5 1 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 53, [1964] CMLR 425. 
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"Such a clearly expressed prohibition which came into force with the Treaty 
throughout the Community, and so became an integral part of the legal system of 
the Member States, forms part of the law of those States and directly concerns 
their nationals, in whose favour it creates individual rights which national courts 
must protect."52 
In Reyners 5 3 and Defrenne No. 2s4 the Court adopted what can be interpreted as a 
legislative approach. These cases concerned treaty provisions which clearly intended to 
lead to Community legislation, or (in the second case) to guarantee the application of a 
Community "principle" by the Member states. Neither of these constituted a clear, 
unconditional and prohibitive provision. Yet the Court, having examined the intention of 
the Treaty and the status of a fundamental principle within the Treaty, found them to be 
directly effective. 
This principle, alongside that of supremacy of Community law,5 5 exemplifies the unique 
nature of Community law in the international legal order, and, not less, the profound 
effect Community law has had upon the laws of its member states. 
A further question, requiring consideration for the present purposes, is that of the 
existence of direct effect of international agreements concluded by the Community or its 
Member States. 
Supra note 51. 
5 3 Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgium [1974] E C R 631, [1974] 2 CMLR 305. 
5 4 Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne (SABENA) [1976] ECR 455, 
[1976] 2 CMLR 98. 
5 5 Supremacy of E C law was referred to in Van Gend in Loos supra note 48 and developed in Costa v. 
EN EL, supra note 51. Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorratstelle fur 
Fiittermittel und Getreide [1970] ECR 1125, 1972 CMLR 255 provides confirmation that not even a 
fundamental rule of national constitutional law could be invoked to challenge the supremacy of directly 
applicable Community law. 
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Direct Effect of International Agreements 
When considering the direct effect of international agreements, regard should be had 
once again for their context. Such agreements regulate the behaviour of states, consistent 
with the traditional operation of international relations and international law. Granting 
such an agreement direct effect means that it is enforceable by individuals, unlike 
traditional international law. 5 6 However, although the grant of direct effect within the 
Community does not directly affect the partner states (whether they would give it direct 
effect would remain a matter for their own law), the interpretative developments could be 
interesting. 
The Court of Justice has developed a two pronged test to establish whether an 
international agreement has direct effect. The first element is that the "spirit, general 
terms and scheme" of the Treaty must be consistent with the possibility of it having 
direct effect. The second element is that the provision be "clear and unconditional". In 
Pabst" the Court applied both tests and found that the agreement was directly effective. 
Yet the Court does not require the presence of both elements in order to grant direct 
effect. In Sevince58 it found that notwithstanding that the agreement per se is too general 
and conditional to be relied upon by individuals, further elucidation of its provisions by 
an authoritative body may cure that defect and confer direct effect. 
There is a further factor to be noted in the cases where the Court has recognised the direct 
effect of an international agreement: that the purpose of the agreement is similar to that of 
the Community.59 It has been suggested that the Court may only have jurisdiction in this 
manner to review the actions of the Community in relation to an international obligation 
5 6 On the relationship between Community law and international agreements see Case 181/73 Haegemann 
v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449, [1975] 1 CMLR 515; Joined Cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company v. 
Produktschaap voor Groenten en Fruit [1972] ECR 1219. 
5 7 Case 17/81 Pabst [1982] ECR 1331, [1983] 3 CMLR 11. 
5 8 Case C-192/89 Sevince [1990] 1 ECR 3461, [1992] 2 CMLR 57. 
5 9 See for example Pabst, supra note 57 and Case 87/75 Conceria Daniele Bresciani v. Amministrazione 
delleFinanze [1976] ECR 129, [1976] 1 CMLR 183. 
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where that obligation falls within internal Community competence. However, Cheyne 
has argued that this approach is unnecessarily restrictive, suggesting that: 
"The institutions are required to comply with the Treaty under which they derive 
their powers, including those in relation to external affairs, ... the Court has the 
power and the duty to ensure the Treaty is complied with. The Member States 
have the right to require compliance with international obligations since the 
Community acts in their name and it must act within the constraints of the Treaty, 
including any rule of law relating to its application. ... The Court of Justice 
therefore has the power to prevent outright violations, even of legal obligations 
that are external to the Community legal system, and it should not necessarily be 
assumed that the executive institutions' right to conduct external affairs is entirely 
discretionary where not limited expressly by the EC Treaty."6 0 
This notwithstanding, even where the Court is willing to recognise that the provisions of 
an international agreement may be directly effective, the biggest challenge remains to be 
for an individual to acquire locus standi.61 
Even i f the Community is competent to conclude an agreement with an essential 
elements human rights clause, and suspension clause, the difficulty remains as to how it 
should be enforced. Individuals and associations are unlikely to be able to demonstrate 
locus standi under the fourth paragraph of Article 173 EC, as interpreted by the Court. 
Therefore it wi l l be the responsibility of the privileged parties62 to ensure that the clauses 
are complied with, yet it is unlikely that they wil l wish to take a strong stance on such a 
6 0 Ilona Cheyne "International Agreements and the European Community Legal System " [1994] 19 
ELRev 581-598. 
6 1 Article 173 E C requires not merely that an individual show sufficient interest, but that he/she 
demonstrate "direct and individual concern". This has been construed fairly narrowly by the court as 
requiring that the individual demonstrate that his/her rights have been affected in a manner in which has 
not applied to others. See inter alia Case 25/62 Plaumann and Co. v. Commission [1963] ECR 95, [1994] 
CMLR 29. 
6 2 Article 173 EC, second paragraph. 
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politically, and economically, sensitive issue. As a result there is, effectively, a potential 
vacuum in the enforcement of these clauses. 
The Conclusion of International Agreements by the Community 
It is only through untangling the respective roles of the Community and Union that the 
competence of the Community to impose human rights standards on other nations may be 
established, along with the identification of the appropriate legal base. Where the 
Community possesses exclusive competence, it alone, acting predominantly through the 
Commission,63 negotiates the Agreement, which is then concluded by the Council. The 
Community possesses explicit powers vis-a-vis the external relations of the European 
Community but only in the strictly limited contexts and spheres outlined above. The 
exercise of this power however must not be contrary to the foreign policy of the Union.6 4 
This correlates with Article 30(5) of the Single European Act, which stated that the 
"external policies of the European Community and European Political Cooperation had 
to be coherent". 
Thus the Community alone cannot enter into agreements other than those involving its 
areas of exclusive competence.65 Without the Member States, it cannot conclude 
international agreements bearing upon human rights unless it establishes that it has been 
attributed the power to do so. Otherwise it will exceed its competence and encroach 
upon a matter reserved for the second pillar: foreign policy. 
6 3 Article 228 E C Treaty. C.F. The development of Foreign policy under the European Union which is 
done exclusively inter-governmentally, and in which the Commission has no role. The Amsterdam 
amendments give the Commission a participatory role, however this will be upon invitation by the 
Council. The Commission will still have no right to initiate proceedings. 
6 4 Article 228a E C Treaty states that "where it is provided, in a Common Position or Joint Action adopted 
according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part or completely economic relations 
with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the necessary urgent measures. The Council shall 
act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission. 
6 5 See Opinion 1/94, supra note 43. 
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International agreements concluded by the Community can, in certain circumstances, 
enter into Community (and thus National) law under the principle of direct effect. It was 
clearly however the express intention of the Member States that matters of Common 
Foreign Policy would not be developed by the Community acting alone in this way. 
The European Union: an Independent International Actor? 
In contrast with the explicit conferral of legal personality upon the Community, there is 
no such provision regarding the Union. This suggests that there was no intention to 
confer upon the EU the power to act as an independent legal person. Examination of the 
Travaux Preparatories66 of the Treaty confirms this. However the terms of Article F of 
the TEU provide an interesting contrast: "the Union shall provide itself with the means 
necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies."67 
This would be difficult to achieve without the power to act itself: which suggests legal 
personality.68 On the other hand, it may mean that the Union has the power to act 
internally, as it certainly does through the Community, and can thus provide itself with 
whatever powers are consistent with its objectives. Alternatively, it may merely mean 
that the Member States of the Union shall act inter-governmentally to provide "the means 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Union." Thus, on one interpretation the 
"Union" would be acting to provide itself with the necessary measures, while in fact it 
would be the Member States, who constitute the Union, acting. 
This discussion ultimately turns on semantics. However, even i f it is the Member States 
acting inter-governmentally who shall so provide the "necessary means..." the least 
Article F does, is create an obligation on the states, acting as the Union. It is submitted, 
however, that "the Member States shall" is quite different to "the Union shall", which 
As discussed by McGoldrick "International Relations Law of the European Union" p.38. 
F.3, T E U , emphasis added. 
See also Art J. 8. 
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indicates an independent identity for the Union as an entity, quite separate from that of its 
constituent members. 
Notably, although in the Amsterdam Treaty Article J. 14 empowers the Council,; 
"where it is necessary to conclude an agreement with one or more States or 
International Organizations... to authorize the Presidency, assisted by the 
Commission as appropriate, to open negotiations to that effect. Such agreements 
shall be concluded by the Council acting unanimously on a recommendation by the 
Presidency." 
the Union has not yet been conferred legal personality by its Member States. However, 
this provision is clearly a compromise in this direction. I f used, it may substantiate the 
requirement that the Union "shall act". Thus any such action, although carried out by the 
Presidency, remains essentially inter-governmental; all the Member States must authorise 
both the negotiations and the agreement. 
The present legal framework clearly does not endorse the Union with the potential to play 
a full role on the international stage, either alongside or instead of individual Member 
States, other than through the Community. Even when the provisions of Amsterdam are 
fully exercised, such action through the Union must be (inter-governmentally) approved 
at both the outset of negotiations, and as to its end result. 
Issues Arising from the Distinction Between the Union and the Community 
It is, as has been seen above, the transferral of competence in particular spheres which 
characterises the Community as an actor in the international order. The economic 
strength and associated influence of the Community give it huge potential as such. The 
responsibility which accompanies such power, and the potential for abuse of the power, 
are of particular importance where loss of domestic jurisdiction (through the conclusion 
of an international treaty) is dependent upon obligations undertaken freely. In such 
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circumstances the economic strength of one partner must not be allowed to double as a 
tool of coercion. To fulf i l the responsibility in this respect there is a clear need that, 
where it is established that the necessary transferral has been effected, the Community, 
just as any other major international actor, should carry out its role coherently. Such role 
certainly may not be fulfilled without an established mechanism for action and legal 
framework to support it. 
Apparently a general competence to act in relation to human rights is not one of the 
Community's attributed powers. Nor is it essential for the operation of Community 
policies. In addition to the common external policies developed within the framework of 
the Community, however, the second pillar of the Union comprises the framework for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. Any examination of "Europe's" role 
cannot consider either of these frameworks in isolation. 
The procedures for, and institutions involved in, the development of Community and 
Union policies are quite distinct. This distinction reflects that between the Community 
and Union per se. The question may of course be raised as to how an international 
organisation may have a clear and transparent foreign policy when its constituent 
members do not, and when there are two separate frameworks in operation. 
Nevertheless, the Community, as a stronger and thus potentially more influential actor, 
has at least as great a responsibility, and therefore a greater need for transparency, as its 
constituent members. 
Significantly, the UK Foreign Office Policy Document of July 1996 states that: "Human 
Rights in Foreign policy covers inter alia EU action on Foreign policy and Trade and 
Human Rights." It does not, however, indicate any Community action on Foreign Policy, 
and refers to: 
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"the inclusion of Human Rights clauses in EU Cooperation Agreements with third 
countries, which allow for the suspension of benefits, including trade and aid 
privileges, in the event of gross Human Rights violations."69 
This is interesting on two counts. First, although it is not incorrect to categorise them as 
EU agreements, it is more precise to refer to such agreements as Community Cooperation 
Agreements. However, as the Foreign Office has made no reference to Community 
Action within the document,70 such classification would appear somewhat surprising. 
Secondly, the Foreign Office omits to state that the EC now endeavours to include an 
essential elements clause relating to human rights and democracy in every international 
trade agreement it negotiates, whether development cooperation or not. This perhaps 
reflects discomfiture, on the part of the Foreign Office, with the fact that the Community 
is apparently encroaching on an issue for which the Member States have expressly placed 
competence with the Union. 
A further issue for consideration arising from the distinction between the Community and 
the Union, is more functionalist. The inclusion of the human rights and democracy 
clause in every international agreement now concluded by the EC, assumes that it may be 
enforced. However, there remains the question as to whether the enforcement itself 
would fall into the competence of the Community. I f not, it must be for the Union to 
enforce. But in such circumstances should the Community independently include this 
clause as an essential element? Either its inclusion is meaningless, or it binds the Union 
as to its enforcement. This however would bind the Union to a certain course of action in 
an area in which the Union's power should be absolute.71 
6 9 Emphasis added. 
7 0 In addition, there is no reference to Union action other than under second pillar. 
7 1 The Union following Community action in this manner can be observed in its Common Position 
concerning human rights, democratic principles and good governance in Africa. 
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The Common Foreign Policy of the European Union 
It was explicit from the inception of the Treaties of the European Communities in the 
1950s that their ultimate goals would not be merely economic. The Preambles to the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the EEC contained references to the 
ultimate objective of political integration.72 This early political ambition reflects the 
environment in which they were created. In the post-World-War context the aim of 
greater union among the peoples of Europe is indicative of the intense desire to rid 
Europe of conflict definitively. Notwithstanding this desire, and the explicit expression 
of this wider aim, neither treaty contains provisions that could remotely be said to move 
towards anything other than economic integration. Early attempts to develop political 
union, for example the Draft European Political Community, were doomed to failure. 
Various factors were at work in this context including (French) nationalism, and doubts 
about the non-participation of the UK, and re-arming Germany under any 
circumstances.73 The Fouchet Plan gave the first reference to the concept of European 
"Union" in relation to political integration. The draft treaty was aimed, essentially, at 
developing foreign and defence policies at an intergovernmental level, in a manner 
fundamentally similar to the framework developed to accommodate the CFSP today. 
Many of the factors at work during this early period continue to have a role in the 
development of today's CFSP framework, the roots of which lie in the European Political 
Cooperation, engendered at the Hague Summit in 1969. This summit marked the end of 
the transitional period, during which the six founding members of the EEC had 
substantially created the kind of economic community envisaged by the Treaty of Rome. 
It was a watershed in the development of the Community, for at this point the six could 
have concluded that sufficient economic and institutional development had been achieved 
7 2 The Schumann declaration, fundamental in the creation of the ECSC referred to "common foundations 
of economic development as a first step towards a European Federation" which was itself "fundamental to 
peace" while in the preamble itself it was pledged to "create, by establishing an economic community, the 
basis for a broader and deeper community among people long divided by bloody conflicts" The preamble 
to the treaty of Rome referred to "determination to lay the foundations for an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe". 
7 J For further discussion of this area see Petersen Nikolaj, "The European Union and Foreign and Security 
Policy ", Nergaard, Pedersen and Petersen. 
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and that no further integration was either desirable or possible. They decided the reverse, 
reflecting the economic and "European" optimism of the period. The Hague Summit 
transformed the role of such summits. In the future they were to be far more active in the 
identification of new areas of Community activity, becoming known as the European 
Council: and developing what was to be known in turn as "European Political 
Cooperation ". It was in the context of the European Council that the insertion of the 
human rights clause in economic cooperation agreements with third countries was 
raised.74 
European Political Cooperation remained informal and intergovernmental when both the 
European Parliament and the European Council picked up the issue in 1984. 
Notwithstanding that their proposals were by no means identical, it is important to note 
the consideration of the matter in both fora, and the evident climate for deepening 
integration of some sort. The European Council convened an Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) the purpose of which was, inter alia, to negotiate a Single European 
Treaty. The Commission's contribution to this, the Cockfield Report (White Paper), was 
heavily influential. The report of this IGC led ultimately to the agreement of what was to 
become the Single European Act (SEA), the negotiations for which included foreign 
policy cooperation. In this context the SEA constituted the codification of existing 
practice and understandings, and imposed an obligation upon Member States, relating to 
information and consultation of each other on foreign policy matters in general, to take 
full account of each other's positions and to "give due consideration to the desirability of 
Common European positions". Even under the SEA however, the decision-making mode 
in relation to EPC was to remain entirely inter-governmental, and was to continue to 
operate through the European Council rather than through one of the institutions of the 
European Community.75 
7 4 Declaration on Human Rights, June 1991, para.l 1. 
7 5 This notwithstanding that discussions in conjunction with the E C Council were explicitly mentioned and 
the European Parliament and Commission were to be "assured of close association" and "fully involved" 
respectively. 
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Thus it can be seen that the combined initiative of the Community institutions was 
required to introduce even the barest bones of formal political cooperation into the 
framework of European cooperation. Continuing pressure during 1989 and 1990 from 
both the European Parliament76 and certain member states led to a further IGC on 
political union, the express objective of which was, inter alia, to define and implement a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. Increased cooperation was opposed by both the 
UK and Spain however, and the compromise reached was the distinction within the 
CFSP, in the TEU, between Article J2 (referring to "systematic cooperation"/ "common 
positions") and Article J3 (referring to "joint action"). Article J2 represents broadly a 
continuation of EPC while J3 is more ambitious, giving rise to binding cooperation. 
Significantly, the TEU placed the CFSP outside the Community, making it the second 
pillar of the Union. 
This leaves the entire issue of common foreign policy in the ambiguous position of being 
developed by the Union, which has no conferred legal personality. Policy developed by 
the Union must be implemented by the Member States collectively or by the Community 
as discussed above. The Community has no power to develop CFSP itself, but must rely 
on the Union in this sphere. 
Article J8 provides that the Council, when implementing CFSP decisions, must act 
unanimously (with the exception of actions under Article J.3). At the Maastricht 
Summit, however, states were obliged not to block measures where a qualified majority 
exists in support of the measure. This proviso did not succeed in entering the Treaty as 
'decision-making by a qualified majority'. Although effectively the same, it was clearly 
politically unacceptable so to express it. 
Its limitations notwithstanding, the TEU widened the scope of cooperation in relation to 
CFSP. In addition, in relation to both commitment and the policy instruments available, 
1 6 The European Parliament charged its Committee on Institutional Affairs to draw up specific plans on 
Political Union: resulting in the Martin I Report which argued that EPC should be integrated into the 
Community. (Endorsed by the Italian Government). 
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the depth of cooperation deepened.77 Thus there is now an existing mechanism by which 
the European Union develops its CFSP, which, once agreed, must be complied with by 
both the Member States, and the European Community, acting in the sphere of its 
external relations. It remains an interesting juxtaposition of intergovernmental and 
Community powers. 
It is necessary at this point to give some brief consideration to the effect of the 
Amsterdam Treaty (ToA) upon the CFSP. One of the fundamental aims of the 1996 IGC 
was to strengthen the CFSP. It may be asked, however, whether substantively this has 
been achieved. Notably, under Article C, the Council and Commission are obliged to co-
operate to achieve consistency in the Union's external activities. Such cooperation is 
exemplified by Article J. 4(4), under which the Commission may now be asked to 
participate in any proposals to ensure the implementation of a joint action. Such 
participation by the Commission is new: the role of the vice president may be crucial, as 
will be his/her relationship with Secretary-General of the Council. Article J4(4) 
strengthens Article J. 17 (former J9), that "the Commission shall be fully associated with 
the work carried out in the common foreign and security field." However the 
Commission's role remains one of participation rather than of initiation in this field. It 
must continue to wait for the Council to act, emphasising the Member States' continuing 
desire to avoid conferring political power upon the Community. 
This distinction and the implications thereof are effectively demonstrated by the success 
of the Community's external economic relations, compared with the political external 
relations of the Union, which have been notable for their comparative failure.78 This 
suggests that a tightening and clarification of the EU's approach to foreign policy action 
(perhaps towards a more integrative and less intergovernmental approach) would be 
helpful, aside from considering the more general issue of having a wider role in the 
protection of human rights. 
7 7 Articles J.3. and J.4. outline the means for adopting either a common position (J.3.) or a joint action 
(J.4.) which is binding upon the member states once adopted thereby committing them, potentially, to 
specific courses of action, whereas previously this was not envisaged. 
7 8 For example, with reference to the former Yugoslavia. 
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The International Perspective 
An additional question concerns the Community's competence to include the human 
rights and democracy clause, in view of the international obligations of its members, and 
indeed itself, under other international treaties in the sphere of trade and human rights. 
The Centro-Com79 judgment recognised the priority of the UN charter over Community 
law. Accordingly, the obligation under the UN Charter to promote human rights may 
override or limit the potential role of the Community or Union in this sphere because 
neither is a member, although their constituent members are members of UN. 
There are further doubts about the legality of this clause under international trade law, 
given the Community's obligations under the GATT. The WTO recently refused to 
include a minimum labour standards clause in GATT, begging the question whether the 
EU can legitimately, under international trade law, invoke human rights standards in this 
context.80 
7 9 Case C-124/95 R. v. HM Treasury and the Bank of England ex parte Centro-Com Sri [1997] ECR1-81, 
[1997] 1 CMLR555. 
8 0 While this is an area of considerable interest, its exploration is beyond the scope of this work, which has 
to focus primarily upon the Community competence from the internal perspective. 
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Conclusions to Part I 
The development of international law whereby actors other than states are now 
recognised has, from an international perspective, undoubtedly given the EU/EC an 
international role in the promotion and protection of human rights and democracy. 
From the internal perspective, some mechanism for the development of CFSP has been 
established under the auspices of the Union, i f not the Community. The implementation 
of that policy must however be disentangled from the Community's exclusive 
competence vis-a-vis external relations to ascertain the best manner and place to develop 
the international role of the Union, in particular in relation to the international protection 
of human rights. It is submitted that the deliberate placing of foreign policy outwith the 
realm of the Community demonstrates the clear intention of the Member States. This is 
particularly important given the effect of Community law on the Member States and the 
special nature of rights conferred by the Community upon individuals. The 
Community's power to conclude international agreements is expressly restricted and its 
express power to develop "foreign policy" is limited to a specific field, development 
cooperation, outside which it can take no further action on the promotion of human rights 
without prior action by the Union. The inclusion of an "essential elements" clause 
relating to human rights and democracy in every trade agreement concluded by the 
Community is therefore a highly questionable practice, unless it can be proved that the 
statement of the European Council in 1991 constituted the development of foreign policy 
binding upon the Community. (This statement was made, however, before the role of the 
European Council and its relationship to the Community were formalised under the SEA 
Furthermore, no joint actions or common positions have been adopted which would 
substantiate such a view). Alternatively, the policy may be legitimate i f an implied or 
parallel power to develop this field exists. 
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Part I I : The Protection of Human Rights in the European Community 
Introduction 
As has been demonstrated, the issue of competence of the European Community81 with 
respect to human rights is complicated by both internal and external pressures. It has 
been established that there is no (general) express Treaty power to act in the field of 
human rights. The Community however, despite having been founded with primarily 
internal, economic objectives, has turned these into a prerogative to take international 
action with respect to non-economic objectives, inter alia in the field of human rights. It 
is necessary at this stage to address the question of how the Community has achieved 
this. 
The development of the protection of "human rights" occurred gradually, as wil l be 
seen, as part of the development of the protection of "rights". This development, 
however laudable in spirit, has raised certain questions: primarily that of which "rights" 
are referred to in any particular instance and to whom they apply. This question is by no 
means unique to the Community. It caused particular problems in the US where in the 
original draft for the American Declaration of Independence Thomas Jefferson, stated 
that: 
"all men are created equal and independent; that from equal creation they derive 
rights inherent and inalienable, among which are the preservation of life and 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." 
this was in sharp contrast to the approach to slaves, who clearly did not equal "men". 
Although the Community does not provide us with such obviously extreme examples, the 
definition of what rights will be protected, and for whom, has troubled it since its 
8 1 Hereafter Community or EC. 
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inception. Indeed, its significance in this context is that the nature of the "right" being 
developed may affect the competence of the Community to act in that particular field. 
Thus the Community has, prima facie, a more obvious role (and one which was earlier 
accepted) in relation to economic than to human rights, and this is reflected in legal 
comment over the years.82 Thus it is necessary to identify what are included as rights in 
the Community context. 
Despite the controversy about what kind of role, i f any, the Community should play in 
the protection of rights, the European Court of Justice83 has recognised its role in the 
protection of "human"84, "moral"8 5, "individual"8 6, "constitutional"87, "community"88 and 
"fundamental personal human rights"89. However, all the rights referred to by these 
varied terms have also all fallen under the heading of "fundamental rights". 
The reason for this is probably largely political and rooted in the history of the status of 
rights in the Community. It cannot be explained by the Court's reluctance to adopt the 
terminology of other jurisdictions, but probably rather the reverse: the adoption of rights 
terminology from other contexts, without the clear establishment of distinctions between 
rights. Nor was attention given to the fact that the nature of rights conferred can affect 
(rightly or wrongly) the manner in which they are applied (and who may benefit from 
them). However, whatever its explanation, it is not satisfactory. The global descriptor of 
8 2 See for example, Mendelson "The European Court of Justice and Human Rights" Y E L (1982) 125; 
Toth "The Individual and European Law" 24 ICLQ (1975) 659. 
8 3 Hereafter Court of Justice, ECJ or Court. 
8 4 Judgment of the Court in Case C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi AE v. Dimotiki Etairia 
Pliroforissis [1991] ECR1-2925. 
8 5 Advocate-General in Case C- l 168/91 Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteigstandesamt [1993] ECR 1-1191, 
[1993] 3 CMLR 401. 
8 6 Judgment of the Court Case 118/75 The State v. Watson and Belman [1976] ECR 1207, [1976] 2 CMLR 
552. 
8 7 Judgment of the Court, Case 44/79 Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3927, [1980] 3 CMLR 42. 
8 8 Advocate-General in Hauer, ibid. 
8 9 Case 149/77 Defrenne v. SABENA (no.3) [1978] ECR 1380, [1978] 3 CMLR 312. 
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"fundamental" belies the fact that some individuals resident in the Community benefit 
from "fundamental" rights not available to others, such as that to free movement. These 
can be dependent upon factors such as Union citizenship or Community nationality, 
whereas other "fundamental" rights apply to all residents and workers of the Community, 
for example the right to equal pay. Having analysed the terminology used by the Court 
therefore, a simple means by which to distinguish these rights, where appropriate, has 
been developed. Thus: those rights given by the Treaty to Community nationals/ Union 
citizens can be described as "community nationals' rights". Rights such as that to equal 
pay which apply to everyone regardless of nationality or citizenship can be described as 
"Community rights". Those recognised in international law as "human rights" can be so 
described. Finally, "fundamental rights" can continue to be used to describe any of these 
collectively, where the distinction is not significant.90 
In order to understand the development of the protection of human rights within the 
Community, and indeed to assess its legitimacy, it is essential to examine the provisions 
relating to human rights within the Treaty of Rome, and its successors. This therefore 
constitutes the first chapter of this section (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 examines the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and its relationship with, first, the Member States, 
and, secondly, the institutions of the Community, as it is necessary that this be 
established before considering the role of the Court of Justice both in the emergence of 
fundamental rights as guiding (and ultimately binding) principles of Community law and 
the development of the relationship between the Community and the ECHR. It also 
briefly considers the "problem" of dual jurisdiction over human rights within the 
Community. Chapter 5 examines the development within the Community of concern 
over human rights violations in third states and, finally, assesses the protection offered to 
fundamental rights within the Community itself. 
See Appendix B for table of examples. 
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Chapter 3: Provision for the Protection of Rights Within the E C / E U Treaties 
The Treaty of Rome 
The Constitutions of France, Germany, Italy and indeed most members of the European 
Community are based upon the rights of man and the protection of fundamental rights. 
Nevertheless, it proved impossible to include within the Treaty of Rome a provision 
relating to human rights. 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and European Atomic Energy 
Community focussed on economic objectives, steering well clear of more political 
questions. The Draft Political Community included ambitious provisions on human 
rights (including the incorporation of Section I of the ECHR). These ambitions, 
however, died with the attempted Political Treaty. The European Economic Community 
(EEC) avoided the non-economic concerns of the draft Political Community which had 
ended in failure. It should be noted that at that time human rights were perceived as 
including only those which would today perhaps be seen as "fundamental human rights". 
Social and economic rights, now also included under consideration of human rights, 
developed later. This provides some explanation for the lack of human rights provision 
within what was essentially an economic treaty. In 1975 it was thought that: 
"the essentially economic character of the Communities .... makes the possibility 
of their encroaching upon fundamental human values, such as life, personal 
liberty, freedom of opinion, conscience etc, very unlikely."9 1 
The right to property provides a clear example of a right that has straddled the 
boundaries: this is one of the classical liberal rights, yet its recognition in the twentieth 
century is less than universal. It was not included in the European Convention, but 
added, subject to many qualifications, in the First Protocol. It is, of course, not provided 
for as a right to be protected in the EC Treaty (except in the context of intellectual 
9 1 Toth, supra note 82. 
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property in Art. 222). Yet in view of its economic implications, the enjoyment of private 
property has been much discussed at the Court of Justice.92 Social and economic rights 
were internationally recognised in 1966 in the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights.93 Evidently the dividing line between categories of rights is 
blurred. It has been suggested94 that i f it is considered that social rights demand state 
action (as opposed to limiting state action as classical human rights do) there are certain 
indications of early recognition of such rights in the Treaty of Rome, for example in 
Articles 117 andll8. 
However, these provisions may equally be seen to be fundamentally economically 
inspired and thus do not actually reflect early consideration of fundamental rights of any 
kind. Similarly, the right to equal pay in Article 119 was included on economic grounds 
- the desire to create a level playing field, thus eliminating (labour) market discrepancies. 
Having stated that there is no provision for the protection of human rights in the Treaty of 
Rome, it is necessary to consider briefly the "Foundations of the European Community": 
free movement of goods, services, capital and persons. The freedom of movement of 
persons is described in Council Regulation 1612/68 as being a "fundamental right of 
workers and their families." These "foundations" are not generally described as human 
rights however: not least because they do not apply universally, but are conditional upon 
the status of the individual concerned, for example that he/she is a Community national. 
Thus, although the Treaty of Rome contained certain provisions which could potentially 
have the effect of conferring rights upon individuals, and others which certainly do 
confer rights upon individuals within the Community, these could not be said to amount 
to human rights. There was certainly no express reference to human, or fundamental, 
rights within the treaty. 
9 2 See, for example, Hauer, supra note 87; Case 5/88, Wachaufw. Germany [1989] ECR 2609 [1991] 1 
CMLR 328. 
"Earlier recognition had come at regional level in 1961: The European Social Charter. 
9 4 Mendelson, supra note 82, at 127. 
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Single European Act 
The Single European Act (SEA) 9 5 finally introduced, in its preamble, the first explicit 
reference to human rights in the Community Treaties. 
"Determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the 
fundamental rights recognised in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, 
in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice. 
It continued with reference to the Community's commitment to the international human 
rights standards endorsed by its members. This commitment was reaffirmed by the 
Community Foreign Ministers when they met later that same year.96 This was 
unprecedented, and important in its own right, but the Treaty of European Union 
(TEU/Maastricht Treaty) subsequently retreated from the terms of this declaration. 
The Treaty of European Union 
By the time of the negotiation and conclusion of the TEU many things had changed. The 
preamble contains a general statement relating to human rights, that the signatories: 
"Confirm their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law." 
This statement in fact follows from the preamble to the SEA. There are, however, certain 
fundamental differences. The TEU departs from the reference to the European Social 
Charter. Indeed its most significant provision on human rights, Article F.2, states that: 
OJ 1987 LI69/1. 
Statement of 21 July 1986, meeting in the framework of European Political Co-operation. 
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"The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
Law." 
Thus, in fact, the TEU, while introducing a general provision on human rights, moves 
back from the wider recognition of the importance of social rights which had been seen in 
the Preamble to the SEA. It reverts to something more closely allied to the economic 
influence requiring the development of certain fundamental rights, while paying little 
attention to the newer, more modern understanding of fundamental rights: that which 
recognises also social rights. 
Article Jl then includes as an objective of the Union: "to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." 
and continues that: "The Union shall pursue these objectives: by establishing systematic 
cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy, in accordance with Art 
J.2...and J.3..." that is, by means of joint actions and common positions. Both of these 
require action by the Council on the initiative of the European Council. This does not 
envisage independent action by the Community. Thus we must look to the provisions of 
the EC Treaty to establish the extent of any relevant Community competence in this field. 
Although the TEU appears, prima facie, to constitute a step forward for human rights 
protection within the Union, certain questions remain, including the limitation as to what 
may be included in the fundamental rights to be protected. It is important to note that the 
general provision on human rights has been kept outside the EC Treaty, enshrined as it is 
in the TEU. Furthermore, Article L, TEU, excludes Article F from the competence of the 
ECJ. The Court has, however, consistently (since the 1970s) developed the protection of 
"fundamental" (including human) rights as a key element of its case law, on occasions 
where the issue, and the possibility, have arisen. Therefore, although, prima facie, the 
exclusion of Article F from the jurisdiction of the Court may limit the extent of judicial 
activism possible in this field in the future, this may not result in a reduction in the legal 
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protection of human rights in the Community. It may well, however, demonstrate a lack 
of political wil l to bring this issue to the same level as the achievement (and 
enforcement) of the economic objectives of the Treaty. 
The distinction that existed in the Treaty of Rome, between the development of 
fundamental Community rights for Community nationals, and fundamental human rights 
for all of mankind, is reinforced by the inclusion of rights relating to Union citizenship 
within Title I I of the TEU 9 7 . This again reflects the economic foundations of the 
Community, and the fact that rights' protection tends to arise as a by product of the 
process of economic integration and the achievement of a Single European Market, rather 
than as a direct result of concern for human rights. This is also perhaps reflected in the 
fact that there is no "Bi l l of Rights" or such list of rights protected under the Community 
or Union. This must be qualified, however, with recognition of the fact that the drive 
towards rights of "Union Citizenship" reflects in addition to economic concerns a desire 
to give citizens of the Union something more in the way of political rights. Thus there is 
still some confusion over the objectives and direction of the Community, with many 
concerns pulling in different directions. Those who gain least are ultimately the group 
with least to offer however, third country nationals. The question the Community has to 
address is how fundamental are the rights and protection it wil l uphold and for whom? 
The provisions relating to Development Cooperation98 expressly state that the promotion 
of respect for human rights and development cooperation are indivisible. Article 130u 
paragraph 2 provides that: "Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms".99 What is clear is that this power 
has been conferred within strict limits and that there is no further power for the 
Community relating to human rights or their promotion within the Treaty. Thus in the 
9 7 Which is subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ. 
9 8 Title XVII, E C . 
9 9 Articles 130w 130x and 130y give the Community the competence to adopt measures necessary to the 
attainment of the objectives, where necessary in co-operation with other third countries. 
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context of development cooperation the Community may make respect for human rights 
a condition of the trade agreement but outwith this specific context there appears to be no 
attributed power. This is consistent with the reservation of foreign policy to the (inter-
governmental) Union. 
Treaty of Amsterdam 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) is interesting in several ways. In the Preamble it 
reverts to some degree to the terms and concerns of the SEA: 
"Confirming their attachment to fundamental social rights as defined in the 
European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 
Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers." 
The amended Article F of the TEU has as its first Paragraph that: 
"The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States." 
The new Article F. 1 adds weight to this provision, providing for the determination of a 
"serious and persistent breach by a Member State of principles mentioned in F(l).. . ." by 
the Council 1 0 0 and for the suspension of rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaty.101 In addition to these provisions relating to current Member States, Article O 
imposes respect for the Principles enshrined in Article F( l ) as a pre-condition for any 
state wishing to accede to the Union. Furthermore, Article L(d) gives the ECJ 
jurisdiction with respect to actions of the Community institutions in relation to Article 
F(2), thereby enhancing its role in relation to human rights. 
1 0 0 Article F . l (1). 
1 0 1 F . l (2). 
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The strengthening of the provisions relating to fundamental rights (both in substance and 
procedure) in the ToA, as compared with the earlier Treaties, perhaps reflects the 
growing public concern relating to the rights of citizens, as well as those of aliens and 
immigrants to the Union. 1 0 2 
With regard to specific provisions, certain Articles relating to Community rights have 
been strengthened by provision for Community action, particularly in the sphere of the 
principle of non-discrimination. For example, Article 6A provides that: 
" . . . Council may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation" 
The Community may also under Articles 2 and 3 take positive action to promote the 
equality of men and women, for the achievement of all its objectives. Thus, i f and when 
the ToA is ratified and comes into force, it may be possible to say that there is a more 
genuine concern for fundamental and Community rights per se emerging within the 
Union, as opposed to more calculated economic considerations. However the question as 
to what wi l l happen if and when these provisions are acted upon, and newly recognised 
and developed rights come into conflict has not yet been addressed. The placing of 
"fundamental rights" at the core of the Union and of the Community may mean that 
economic objectives wil l become secondary where they would infringe "fundamental 
rights". At present however, and until such time as the ToA is ratified and brought into 
force the law which must be adhered to and the priorities which should be followed are 
those of the TEU. 
1 0 2 This is further reflected in the communitarisation of the Schengen Acquis and elements of the Third 
Pillar of the Union. These issues of course also reflect concerns over the ever closer prospect of 
enlargement of the Union. 
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Chapter 4: The European Convention on Human Rights and the European 
Community 
It has been established above that notwithstanding that there is no reference to the 
protection of human rights per se in the TEU, the Union "shall respect fundamental rights 
as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights".103 It is now time, 
therefore, to examine more closely the relationship between the ECHR and both the 
Member States, and institutions, of the Community. 
The initial confusion that often arises, is in the misconception that the ECHR is somehow 
related to the Community. Although all the Member States of the Community are 
signatories of the ECHR, and adherence to the ECHR standards is a pre-condition for 
accession to the Union, the institutional frameworks behind each of these are quite 
distinct. The ECHR was created by the Council of Europe which itself was formed at the 
end of the 1940s under similar sentiments to those inspiring the Community. However, 
where the Community sought to prevent the recurrence of war within Europe by the 
development of economic strength through integration and interdependence, the Council 
of Europe, on a larger scale, sought to improve the social, cultural and political life of 
Europe which had been devastated during the war. 
Initially, in 1949, the Council of Europe had ten signatories: but it has grown rapidly 
since then.104 Its primary aim today is to protect human rights and pluralist democracy, 
yet the importance of this aim from very early on in its development is demonstrated by 
the fact that the ECHR was concluded in 1950. 
Various issues arise with regard to the relationship between the ECHR and the Union/ 
Community. The first is, of course, that neither the Union nor the Community is a 
signatory to the ECHR. Given that the Union has no legal personality and thus no power 
Article F.2 TEU. 
40 Members by 1998; in addition Belarus has lodged its application for membership. 
48 
Human Rights in the European Community 
to accede to international organisations or to sign international agreements this is not 
surprising. However, the Community does possess the necessary personality105 so, the 
question arises, why has it not acceded? 
It must not be ignored that there are two sides (at least) to every international obligation. 
Under the terms of the ECHR only states are competent to accede to it. This technical 
difficulty alone leaves the Community in a somewhat paradoxical situation, regardless of 
whether it desires or is indeed competent to accede to the ECHR from an internal 
perspective. 
The Position of the Member States of the Community vis-a-vis the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Each of the Member States of the Community is bound by the obligations it has 
undertaken in the ECHR. In international law it is the primary responsibility of the 
individual state to ensure the observance of its international obligations within its own 
jurisdiction, leaving it to the discretion of the individual state to select the means and 
mechanisms by which it does so. 
The result of this is that certain states, for example France and Germany, operate a 
"monist" system of law, by which international law obligations are automatically, from 
the moment of ratification, part of the domestic legal system and are thereby directly 
effective within that legal system. Other states, however, for example the United 
Kingdom, operate a "dualist" system of law. In these states obligations of international 
law do not give rise to directly effective rights until such time as they have been 
explicitly incorporated into the domestic legal system by an Act of the national 
parliament. This does not permit avoidance of international law obligations: it means 
that individuals cannot assert rights arising from international law before the domestic 
courts until incorporation. A violation of the provisions of an international treaty would 
be open to an inter-state challenge even i f there were no means of individual 
1 0 5 Article 210 E C (Chapter 1 above). 
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enforcement. In the case of the ECHR, however, individuals, including those from 
"dualist" states, may petition the European Court of Human Rights directly to enforce 
their rights.1 0 6 Thus the domestic law of each Member State must be consistent with 
obligations under the ECHR. This is where a paradox arises in relation to the position of 
the Community. 
The Relationship between the European Community and the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
The ECHR was already established when the Community was formed in 1957. The 
original members of the Community were already members of the Council of Europe and 
signatories to the Convention. Yet it was not possible to include within the Treaty of 
Rome reference to either the issue of the protection of human rights generally, or, more 
specifically, to the ECHR itself. This position has now changed; the TEU provides that 
the Union "shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the European Convention 
on Human Rights",107 however the practical effect of this is limited by Article L, whereby 
the Court of Justice has no jurisdiction over this matter. Furthermore, regardless of 
whether the Union may consider that it shall respect these rights, it is not bound by the 
ECHR, nor is it subject to its enforcement mechanisms. 
This raises an interesting distinction between the actions of the Union and the 
Community. It is unlikely that the Member States, acting inter-governmentally within the 
context of the Union would collectively breach their obligations under the ECHR. The 
situation may arise, however, whereby the Community, not being bound, legislates in the 
pursuit of its legitimate objectives in such a way as breaches the ECHR. While clearly 
this is unlikely to be a direct breach, a Community measure in one sphere may have the 
1 0 6 This is provided for under Article 25 of the Convention. Although this is a discretionary provision, all 
the Member States have in fact adopted measures allowing individual petition. Until September 1998, 
petition was made to the European Commission of Human Rights which screened cases, only about 100 
arriving before the Court of Human Rights itself. For details of the new system see Schermers, "Guest 
Editorial" (1998) 35 CMLRev 2. 
1 0 7 Article F.2. TEU. 
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effect of breaching a right conferred by the ECHR. Prima facie, the situation may arise 
where a Community measure is in conflict with a provision of the ECHR. The Member 
States of the Community, bound under the doctrine of supremacy of Community law, 
would be faced with the situation in which they must breach either Community law, by 
not implementing the measure, or their obligations under the ECHR by implementing the 
measure. 
Various solutions have been offered to resolve this problem, the root of which lies in the 
two parallel legal systems operating within Europe, each in the pursuit of different aims. 
On the one hand there is the ECHR with its objective of improving and guaranteeing 
human rights protection, on the other hand is the Community, whose primary objective 
remains the achievement of economic growth through integration and inter-dependence. 
At the time of the Community's conception and for many years thereafter, it was not 
envisaged that there would be any overlap of jurisdiction between the two. 1 0 8 Since the 
1970s it has become increasingly clear however, that the two systems do overlap and 
that, potentially, measures under one system may impede the realisation of the objectives 
of the second. 
The Role of the Court of Justice in Determining the Position of Fundamental Rights 
in the Community 
The importance of fundamental rights within the Community initially arose in the 
jurisprudence of the Court, as a corollary of the need to provide effective protection 
within the Member States of rights conferred upon individuals by the Community. This 
itself was a live issue in the Court from the outset of the Communities. The ECJ was 
vital in the development of the protection of human rights in the Community through its 
jurisprudence relating to the protection of "rights" generally. This has given rise to 
confusion and imprecision in the terminology relating to the protection of rights in the 
Community. 
e.g. Toth and Mendelson, supra note 82. 
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As stated above,109 the case by case basis on which the protection of rights was developed 
in the Community gave rise to a haphazard categorisation of "fundamental rights" which 
were also described in other terms in other cases. An analysis of the terminology of the 
ECJ in its case law developing the protection of "fundamental rights" supports the 
definitional distinction laid out above.110 This analysis demonstrated a clear line of 
development. However, the uncertain ground on which the Court was treading, coupled 
with the fact that the development of any field by the Court must be to some extent 
haphazard, as it depends on the nature of the cases coming before it, disguised the 
consistency of this development. Furthermore, the broad terminology used, and the fact 
that the only term consistently used was "fundamental rights" obscured in some measure 
the breadth of the development. 
(i)The Development of the Protection of Fundamental Rights 
The protection of "fundamental rights" was first raised before the ECJ in 1958 in Stork v. 
High Authority"*1 which concerned the right of an undertaking to challenge decisions 
taken by the High Authority. In this case it was the Applicant who used the term 
"fundamental rights", referring to rights under the constitutions of virtually all the 
Member States. Stork argued that the High Authority should have considered German 
Constitutional Law when taking its decision. The case related to a decision by the six 
joint selling agencies of the Ruhr, to limit direct sales to wholesalers whose turnover was 
greater than that of Stork. Stork sought annulment of this decision, arguing that it 
contravened Articles 2 and 12 of the (West) German Grundgesetz which guarantee to 
each individual the rights to freely develop his own personality and to choose his own 
trade or occupation respectively. The Court rejected this argument, stating that it was 
competent only to apply Community law in annulling a decision. Thus it avoided any 
consideration of "fundamental rights", confining itself to interpretation of the Treaty and 
109 Introduction to Part II. 
110 Introduction to Part II. 
'" Case 1/58 Stork v. High Authority [1959] ECR 7. 
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the issue of its competence only to apply Community Law. Nor did Advocate-General 
Lagrange pick up the invitation to bring rights, "fundamental" or other, into 
consideration. The approach of the Court was confirmed in 1960 in Geitling.m These 
joined cases also involved a challenge by a Ruhr coal wholesaler to a decision of the 
High Authority, with the additional ground of challenge on the basis of Article 14 of the 
Grundgesetz (which guarantees private property). 
It should be noted in relation to these cases that they preceded the establishment of the 
relationship between Community and national law. The fact that the Community 
constituted a new legal order, giving rights to individuals and Member States, and the 
principle that this new legal order was supreme over those of the Member States had not 
yet been laid down. Thus the nature of the relationship between the different legal orders 
operating within the Community had not yet been defined. That the Court was feeling its 
way in these early cases is clearly demonstrated in Humblet v. Belgium."3 Here the 
Court stated the need for effective enforcement of "rights" conferred by Community law, 
but emphasised also that the means of enforcement was left to the individual Member 
States, and that the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty was developed 
following a strict doctrine of separation of powers. The Court could not annul an 
administrative measure of a Member State (even where it was in contravention with 
Community law), nor could it enforce a provision of national law. 
In these early cases the Court was defining the limits of its power. Significantly, at this 
time, it was operating in a context in which human rights had recently been expressly 
omitted from the Treaty of Rome. Judicial activism in this field at that time would 
therefore have been rash, i f not indeed fatal to the authority of the Court of Justice. Thus, 
although it was later to develop the protection of fundamental rights within the 
Community in a manner which prima facie conflicts with its early approach, to suggest 
that the Court performed a U-turn in this field ignores the context of its early 
jurisprudence. Rather, the Court stated the limits of its jurisdiction and competence and 
1 1 2 Joined Cases 36-38, 40/59 Geitling v. High Authority [1960] ECR 423. 
1 1 3 Case 6/60 Humblet v. Belgium [1960] ECR 559. 
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then proceeded to build upon these limits, as and when cases came before it and the 
opportunity arose. 
The establishment of the nature of the relationship between Community and national law 
was to be crucial to the development of, inter alia, fundamental rights within the 
Community. Of seminal importance in this were the Van Gend en LoosnA and Costa v. 
ENELUS cases. 
In Van Gend en Loos the Court stated that: 
"The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the 
benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within 
limited fields"" 6 
The Court subsequently took this a stage further, in Costa v. ENELU1 when it introduced 
the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law : 
"The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive 
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the treaty, 
make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a 
unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system adopted by them on a basis 
of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with that legal 
system. The executive force of Community Law cannot vary from one State to 
another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the 
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 5(2) and giving rise to 
the discrimination prohibited by Article 7. 
1 1 4 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen [ 1963] ECR 1; [ 1963] 
CMLR 105. 
1 , 5 Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425. 
116 Supra note 114, para. 4. 
117 Supra note 117. 
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The precedence of Community Law is confirmed by Article 189, whereby a 
Regulation "shall be binding" and "directly applicable in all Member States". 
This provision, which is subject to no reservation, would be quite meaningless i f a 
State could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which 
could prevail over Community Law. 
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the treaty, an 
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, 
be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question 
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community 
legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a 
permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent 
unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.""8 
This excerpt from the judgment, although relatively lengthy, provides a comprehensive 
explanation of the Court's view of the nature of the Community legal system, and the 
consequences of the transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to the Community 
institutions, the institutions of this new, independent, legal order. 
Van Gend en Loos,U9 in addition to establishing that the Community created a new and 
independent international legal order, clearing the way for the establishment of the 
supremacy of Community law, served the additional purpose of placing the individual at 
the heart of the Community. 
118 Ibid "On the submisson that the Court was obliged to apply the national law". 
119 Supra note 114. 
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"Independently of the Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes 
obligations upon individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of the legal heritage" 
Traditionally, international law had regulated only inter-state relations, but this was a 
further element distinguishing Community law from what had formerly been understood 
as international law. 1 2 0 The establishment of the doctrine of direct effect and of the 
supremacy of Community Law, in Van Gend en Loos and Costa v. ENEL, established 
also the nature of the relationship between Community and national law. 
Following this development, the Court, in Sgarlata,m was once again offered the 
opportunity to consider the rights of individuals. It is notable that this case concerned not 
the ECSC, as the previous cases had, but the EEC, with its rather wider ambit and 
competencies. In this case the applicant had requested the annulment of certain 
regulations. The Court held, however, that Article 173(2) does not allow individuals to 
challenge regulations: 
"The applicants object that, i f recourse to Article 173 were to be refused by 
reason of a restrictive interpretation of its wording, individuals would thus be 
deprived of all protection by the courts both under Community law and under 
national law, which would be contrary to the fundamental provisions governing 
all the Member States. 
However these considerations, which wil l not be considered here, cannot be 
allowed to override the clearly restrictive wording of Article 173, which it is the 
Court's task to apply."122 
1 2 0 See Part I above. 
1 2 1 Case 40/64 Sgarlata and Others v. Commission [1965] ECR 215, [1966] CMLR 314. 
122 Ibid at p.227 ECR, p.324 CMLR 
56 
Human Rights in the European Community 
This case once again concerns an attempt by an individual to overturn a Community act, 
not on this occasion on the basis of the Constitutional provisions of one Member State, 
but on the basis of the fundamental principles shared by all the Member States. The 
Community however, invoked the supremacy of Community law over even shared 
national law. The provision of the Treaty was clear, and the Court had no choice but to 
apply it. 
The challenges against Community acts contravening fundamental rights and principles, 
however, reflected genuine concern in the Constitutional courts of the Member States and 
the doctrine of the supremacy of Community law was not sufficient to quash this. 
Rather, it raised the question of the authority of national legislatures to derogate from 
constitutional principles through the transferral of authority to a supra-national body. 
Clearly the authority to derogate from constitutional rights, even in this way, did not 
exist. It was eminently possible therefore that a national court would refuse to apply 
Community law on the grounds that it was constitutionally unlawful. 
The Court began to address this concern in Stauder.123 This case involved the assertion 
by the applicant that an obligation under the (German) implementing legislation of a 
Community Decision breached his fundamental rights. The Court avoided dealing 
directly with the question of the relationship between fundamental rights and Community 
law, side stepping it to rule that the correct interpretation of the Community Decision was 
the most liberal one and that: 
"interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of 
prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of 
Community law and protected by the Court."124 
1 2 3 Case 29/69 Stauder v. City of Vim [1969] ECR 419, [1970] CMLR 112. 
124 Supra note 121, para. 7. 
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Thus, the breach had arisen at national level and was not a matter for the Court. This 
dictum was however significant, in that it was the first occasion on which the Court 
acknowledged human rights among the fundamental principles of Community law. 
In Stauder it had been relatively easy for the Court to interpret the Community provision 
appropriately, avoiding violating fundamental constitutional principles. The place of 
respect for human rights at the heart of the Community legal order was confirmed, 
however, in the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft125 case. This case arose following a 
series of rulings by the Administrative Court of Frankfurt that certain agricultural 
regulations were in violation of the fundamental principle of proportionality. In 1970 it 
referred the International Handelsgesellschaft case to the ECJ. The ECJ ruled once again 
that the fundamental (constitutional) rights or constitutional principles of a Member State 
could not bring into question the validity of a Community act as this would question the 
legal basis of the Community itself. It did however state that: 
"... respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles 
of law protected by the Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst 
inspired by the constitutional traditions common to the member States, must be 
ensured within the framework of the structure and objectives of the 
Community... "'26 
The Court was thus explicit that although fundamental rights were to be protected within 
the Community, they were secondary to achieving the objectives of economic 
integration. 
This alone was not sufficient to reassure the guardians of the constitutions of the Member 
States, particularly Italy and Germany, from which two states most of the litigation in 
this field had arisen. In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft121 the German Federal 
125 Supra note 55. 
1 2 6 Emphasis added. 
127 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1974] 2 CMLR 540. 
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Constitutional Court held, that as long as the Community did not have a democratically 
elected parliament, with legislative power and a codified Catalogue of Human Rights, 
directly applicable secondary legislation of the Community would not be capable of 
overriding national constitutional human rights provisions. Similarly, in Frontini,128 the 
Italian Constitutional Court reserved the right to declare the Treaty incompatible with the 
Constitution in the event of Community legislation which breached the "fundamental 
principles of our constitutional order or the inalienable rights of man". 
By the time of Steinike129 in 1980 the German Federal Constitutional Court was less 
certain about whether the principles of its 1974 decision (Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaftli0) were still valid in relation to "derived Community norms". No 
doubt because inter alia the European Parliament was by that time directly elected, 
although not having the legislative powers the German Constitutional Court had sought, 
nor, of course, did (or does) the Community possess a codified Bil l of Rights. However, 
the Joint Declaration of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 1977131 after 
referring to the jurisprudence of the Court refers to the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitutions of the Member States and to the European Convention on Human Rights. 
A further contribution to the relaxation of the German Constitutional Court's stance must 
doubtless have been the continued development of the ECJ's own approach. 
The Court's approach was initiated in the Transoceanmarine Paint Association"2 case. 
Advocate-General Warner here built on the shared principles of Member States as 
fundamental rights to be protected by Community Law, acknowledging that audi alteram 
partem was a principle of neither Italian nor the Netherlands' law, yet concluding that it 
128 Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze Giurisprudenza Constituzionale [1974] CMLR 372. 
129 Steinike und Weinlig [1980] 2 CMLR 531. 
130 Supra note 127. 
1 3 1 OJ 1977 C 103/1. This Declaration was an indirect endorsement of Court's approach to HR protection. 
1 3 2 Case 17/74 Sadolin & Holmblad A/S, members of the Transocean Marine Paint Association v. 
Commission [1974] ECR 1063 [1974] 2 CMLR 459. 
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was a principle which the ECJ should protect.133 The Court did not refer to this in its 
judgment. It did, however, refer to the "general rule that a person whose interests are 
perceptibly affected by a decision taken by a public authority must be given the 
opportunity to make his point of view known" 1 3 4 without referring to this "general rule"'s 
source. 
In Van Duynus the ECJ referred to a further source of rights to be protected, ruling that: 
"it is a principle of international law, which the EEC Treaty cannot be assumed to 
disregard in the relations between the Member States, that a State is precluded 
from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence."136 
The next key development was in Defrenne (no.2).ul The Court ruled that Article 119 
EEC, (the principle of equal pay between men and women) was "part of the foundations 
of the Community". Once again, however, the Court did not, at this stage, go as far as its 
Advocate-General: Trabucchi had suggested, that the principle constituted a 
"fundamental human right". (The Court recognised the involvement of a "fundamental 
human right" in this regard in Defrenne (no.3).m) The Court did however establish the 
existence of horizontal direct effect in Defrenne (no.2), by recognising that the principle 
of equal pay could be invoked between individuals as well as against the national 
authorities. This was of profound importance in the development of the protection of 
individuals' rights in the Community. 
133 Ibid, pp. 1088-9, ECR; pp.469-470 CMLR. 
134/6/</p.l080, para. 15. 
1 3 5 Case 41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, [1975] 1 CMLR 1. 
l 3 6Supra note 135, para 22 (emphasis added). 
1 3 7 Case 43/75 Defrenne v. SABENA [1976] ECR 455, [1976] 2 CMLR 98. 
1 3 8 Case 149/77 Defrenne v. SABENA (no.3) [1978] ECR 1380, [1978] 3 CMLR 312. 
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Thus throughout the 1970s the Court actively developed the protection it could offer to 
fundamental rights and to individuals, drawing on a widening range of sources: from the 
outset, at which point it considered only the Treaty, to considering even principles of 
international law. 
The above account, focusing as it does on the development of the protection of 
fundamental rights within the Community, has bypassed a very important source 
increasingly drawn on by the Court, the ECHR itself. The Court, crucial in the 
development of the protection of rights in the Community, was also vital in the 
establishment of the relationship between the Community and the ECHR. 
(ii) The Development of the relationship between the European Community and the 
European Convention of Human Rights 
While expanding the range of sources that could be considered in its judgments, the ECJ 
did not neglect the existence of the ECHR. As it established the shared principles of the 
Member States as a valid source of fundamental principles to be protected by the 
Community, it became possible for the ECJ to include the ECHR (to which all the 
Member States were party) as guidance in establishing these principles. 
It was Advocate-General Mayras, in Boehringer,U9 who first relied upon the ECHR, 
alongside reference to principles of national law of the Member States. Although the 
ECJ, typically, did not itself refer to the ECHR in its judgment, this was only to be a 
question of time. Within eighteen months the Court had moved one step closer to doing 
so, referring in Nold (2)U0 to the applicant's reliance on the ECHR, as well as the German 
Grundgesetz: 
"As the Court has already stated, fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of law, the observance of which it ensures. In safeguarding 
these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from the constitutional 
1 3 9 Case 7/72 Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission [1972] ECR 1281, [1973] CMLR 864. 
1 4 0 Case 4/73 Firma J. Nold v. Commission [1974] ECR 491, [1974] 2 CMLR 338. 
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traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot uphold measures which 
are incompatible with fundamental rights recognised and protected by the 
Constitutions of those States. Similarly, international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated, or of which they are 
signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the 
framework of Community Law." 1 4 1 
Although this judgment did not explicitly refer to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, this was clearly the Court's intention: the applicant's reference to the ECHR had, 
in turn, been referred to by the Court. In addition by the wording "on which the Member 
States have collaborated or of which they are signatories" is unmistakably a reference to 
the ECHR, which until a week before the Nold (2) judgment had not been ratified by 
France. 
It is interesting, however, that the ECJ, having stated that it was "bound to draw 
inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the member States", went on to 
state only that "international treaties.... can supply guidelines which should be followed", 
thereby suggesting that the shared constitutional traditions of the Member States are more 
important than the Conventional provisions, which are not necessarily binding. Certainly 
i f these had come into conflict at this point, the shared constitutional traditions would 
have had supremacy. Consequently, it can also be argued that had a provision of the 
Treaty come into conflict with a provision of the (European or other) Convention, the 
provision of the Treaty would have been upheld. 
In Rutili142 the ECJ finally explicitly referred to specific provisions of the ECHR. It must 
be noted in this respect however, that it referred first to Article 48 EEC, stating that it 
was a:"specific manifestation of the more general principle, enshrined in Articles 8, 9, 10 
and 11 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms". 
m Ibid, para.13. 
1 4 2 Case 36/75 Rutili v. Minister of the Interior [1975] E C R 1219, [1976] 1 CMLR 140. 
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This suggests that at this point the ECJ, while emphasising the importance of the ECHR, 
was not yet ready to rely solely upon a provision of it and would still require a corollary 
provision within the Treaty to apply. Conversely, the Court may have been interpreted 
here as indicating that the ECHR had been incorporated into Community law and that its 
provisions were therefore directly effective. 
Advocate-General Trabucchi, not surprisingly, in Watson and Belmannw quashed any 
such suggestions. 
"In fact, in that judgment [Rutili], the Court substantially reaffirmed the principle 
which had already emerged from its previous decisions that the fundamental 
human rights recognised under the Constitutions of the Member States are also an 
integral part of the Community legal order. 
The extra-Community instruments under which those states have undertaken 
international obligations in order to ensure better protection of those rights can, 
without any question of their being incorporated as such into the Community 
order, be used to establish principles which are common to the States 
themselves." 
The Court followed this approach in its judgment. It upheld the principle of supremacy 
of Community over national law while using sources such as the ECHR to identify 
shared principles, yet without being accused of having incorporated such Conventions 
into Community law and thus without running the risk of becoming bound by them. This 
was in marked contrast to the submission of the Commission which had stated that: 
"Following its ratification by the member States, the Convention is now legally 
binding upon the Community, both in relation to measures adopted by the 
Community institutions and each time that a provision of Community law is 
invoked." 
143 Supra note 86. 
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Again in Royeri44 the ECJ resisted the Commission's invitation to declare itself bound by 
the ECHR. It was not until Hauer145 that the Court finally proved itself willing to deal 
explicitly with the nature of the effect of the ECHR upon Community law. This was the 
first case in which the ECJ dealt with a provision of the ECHR in detail and, indeed, it 
even construed i t . 1 4 6 Even in this case, however, the Court still felt obliged to refer also 
to national law in its analysis of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. The ECJ 
arrived at its ruling on slightly different grounds from those of its Advocate-General 
(Capotorti). Both, however, arrived at substantially the same conclusion. Typically, the 
ECJ acknowledged that the provision of the ECHR did give rise to a right which should 
be protected in Community law, but held that that right had not been violated in the 
instant case. 
In Pecastaing141 shortly afterwards, Advocate-General Capotorti accepted without further 
discussion that "... regard must be had for the basic principles of a fair hearing which are 
to be inferred from Article 6 of the European Convention", and continued by discussing 
the case law of the Commission and Court of Human Rights. Once again, however, he 
did not see that the relevant directive violated the right under Article 6 and as established 
by the case law of the Court and Commission of Human Rights. The ECJ followed his 
advice on this. In its judgment it simply referred to the Convention, without any 
discussion of earlier case law to justify this move. 
Thus it can be seen that although the ECJ was now willing to apply the ECHR, it had not 
yet been faced with the need to annul a Community act for violation of one of its 
provisions. The National Panasonic*4* case, decided in the same year as Pecastaing, saw 
a further shift in emphasis by the ECJ in its treatment of international conventions on 
1 4 4 Case 48/75 The State v. Royer [1976] ECR 497, [1976] 2 CMLR 552. 
145 Supra note 87. 
li6Ibid, para 17. 
1 4 7 Case 98/79 Pecastaing v. Belgian State [1980] ECR 691, [1980] 3 CMLR 42. 
1 4 8 Case 136/79 National Panasonic (UK) Ltd\. Commission [1980] ECR 2057, [19980] 3 CMLR 169. 
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human rights. Whereas in Nold149 and Hauer150 such conventions had been referred to as 
"providing guidelines" as to the existence of rights to be protected by the Community, in 
National Panasonic the Court stated that: 
"As the Court stated in .... Nold fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of law, the observance of which the Court ensures, in 
accordance with constitutional traditions common to the Member States and with 
international treaties on which the member States have collaborated or of which 
they are signatories."151 
By the beginning of the 1980s it was clear that the Court had moved a long way from its 
initial inability to apply or enforce fundamental principles or rights not enshrined in the 
Treaty. It had first drawn on the "common constitutional traditions of the Member 
States"152 and had even limited this further, with a reference to "fundamental rights 
recognised and protected by the Constitutions of those states".153 But in National 
Panasonic154 the Court moved back again to a slightly less stringent formula. At this 
point the ECHR was a source of Community law, notwithstanding that the Community 
could not accede to it without modification of both the EEC Treaty and the ECHR itself, 
nor was the Community bound by the enforcement mechanisms of the Convention. 
Perhaps having foreseen the problems that were to arise, largely as a result of the fact that 
it was not subordinate to the enforcement mechanisms of the Convention, the Court, in 
its jurisprudence had not referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(unlike its Advocates-General). It had also, expressly, made the binding nature of the 
Convention reliant upon the fact that the Convention expressed principles common to the 
149 Supra note 140. 
150 Supra note 87. 
151 Supra note 148, para. 18. 
152 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, supra note 55. 
153 Nold (2) supra note 140. 
154 Supra note 148. 
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Member States, refusing to declare the Community institutions bound by the Convention 
in the context of Community law, as it had been repeatedly invited to do by the 
Commission. 
Thus the Court kept control of its own autonomy, refusing to concede any possibility of 
becoming subordinate to the European Court of Human Rights and tying the fundamental 
rights which it wi l l apply, and protect, very firmly to the Community legal order. The 
benefits of this were to become apparent through the 1980s. 
In the Cinetheque case15S the Court was explicit that: 
"although it is true that it is the duty of this Court to ensure observance of 
fundamental rights in the field of Community Law, it has no power to examine 
the compatibility with the European Convention of national legislation which 
concerns, as in this case, an area which falls within the jurisdiction of the national 
legislator."156 
Although Lord Slynn stated: 
"In my opinion it is right, as the Commission contends, that the exceptions in 
Article 36 and the scope of mandatory requirements taking a measure outside 
Article 30 should be construed in the light of the Convention"157 
What this reflects is the recurrent question of what falls within the scope of Community 
law. While the ECJ saw the matter as being one of purely national competence, Slynn 
viewed it as a matter that did indeed fall within the scope of Community law. The 
approach of the ECJ reflects its caution as to the extent of its jurisdiction. 
1 5 5 Joined Cases 60 & 61/84 Cinetheque SA and Others v. Federation nationale des Cinemas francais 
[1985] ECR2605, [1986] 1 CMLR 365. 
156 Supra note 155, para 26. 
'"Ibidp. 2616/p.379. 
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This same caution was demonstrated once again by its judgment in Demirel}™ In which 
there was, however, a subtle, but crucial, change of emphasis. In Cinetheque the ECJ had 
stated that it was not competent to rule on a matter falling within the jurisdiction of the 
national legislator, this was turned round in Demirel: 
"[The Court] has no power to examine the compatibility with the European 
Convention on Human Rights of national legislation lying outside the scope of 
Community Law"'5V 
Whereas Cinetheque could be interpreted as meaning that a matter which fell within both 
national and community law fields would be outwith the scope of review of the Court in 
relation to fundamental rights, Demirel suggests that it would be subject to such review. 
Thus it is apparent that as regards a matter within the scope of Community law, the Court 
is competent to rule on an act of the national legislator as regards its compatibility with 
the Convention. The question is where the line is drawn within the grey area that may, in 
different respects, fall within Community and national competence. 
In relation to the certainty arising from them, that the ECJ may rule on a matter falling 
within the scope of Community law, these decisions do not appear to be surprising. Two 
factors are of importance here: first, the ECJ's determination to limit strictly the impact 
of the ECHR in European law per se, and notably upon itself, and secondly, the sensitive 
nature of the protection of fundamental rights. The ECJ is always politically, as well as 
legally, very aware of the limits upon its jurisdiction. Additionally the effect of the 
ECHR, as of any other Treaty of international law, is determined, as has been seen above, 
by the individual legal system in each individual state. Therefore the ECJ cannot begin 
to interfere in this field, unless there is a link to an aspect of Community law which can 
be used to assert competence to rule in relation to the ECHR. It has been suggested160 
1 5 8 Case 12/86 Demirel v. Stadt Schwiibisch Gmiind [1987] ECR 3719, [1989] 1 CMLR 421. 
159 Ibid, para 28 (emphasis added). 
1 6 0 Dallon "An Overview of European Community Protection of Human Rights, with some Special 
References to the UK" (1990) CMLRev 27: 761-790 at p 782. 
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that the ECJ's approach in this respect has "added to the lacunae of rights protection in 
English law." However, the question of the adequacies or otherwise of the enforcement 
of the ECHR in the UK is one which is quite separate from, and should not be confused 
with, that relating to the extent of the ECJ's competence to ensure human rights. The 
effect of the ECHR in UK law is intrinsically linked to the dualist system of law in the 
UK. Individuals in the UK have the right of individual petition to the European Court of 
Human Rights, which, under the existent mechanisms for the enforcement of the 
Convention and as compared with the ECJ, is the correct forum for the enforcement of 
human rights provisions. The question of incorporation of the ECHR into UK law 
remains a matter of national law. 1 6 1 This is not an area into which the ECJ can step, to f i l l 
perceived lacunae, particularly as it should be recalled that i f the ECJ were to take such a 
stance to fill the "lacunae" observed in one state (the UK), by virtue of that same action it 
would encroach upon the jurisdiction of national judiciaries of the other member states. 
Additionally, to encourage the enforcement of the ECHR by the ECJ ignores the fact that 
there is no system for preliminary reference between the two jurisdictions, and that the 
ECJ is not in fact bound by the ECHR. This would only add to the interpretative 
problems discussed below. 
The change of emphasis in Demirel was instrumental in the decision reached by the ECJ 
in Wachauf*62 where it declared itself competent to review the validity of the acts of the 
national legislature in accordance with the ECHR when implementing Community law 
which itself protects a fundamental right.163 Clearly, in this context at least, the Court is 
declaring itself bound not merely to respect the principles and rights arising from the 
ECHR but indeed, that it will ensure the respect of these rights by the Member States. 
The ECJ went further still in the ERT164 case, stating: 
1 6 1 The ECHR has now been incorporated into UK law (The Human Rights Act (1998) which will come 
into effect in 2000). 
1 6 2 Case 5/88 Wachaufv. Germany [1989] ECR 2609, [1991] 1 CMLR 328. 
163 Ibid, paras. 17-19. 
164 Supra note 84. 
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"the Court cannot assess, from the point of view of the European Convention on 
Human rights national legislation which is not situated within the body of 
Community law. By contrast, as soon as any such legislation enters the field of 
application of Community law, the Court, as the sole arbiter in this matter, must 
provide the national court with all the elements of interpretation which are 
necessary to enable it to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the 
fundamental rights - as laid down in particular in the European Convention on 
Human Rights - the observance of which this Court ensures."165 
Thus measures that are incompatible with respect for human rights recognised and 
guaranteed in the Community legal order could not be permitted in the Community. The 
ECJ made it clear that in the event that national authorities restrict one of the 
fundamental freedoms of the Community, it will only be justified i f it complies with the 
provisions of the ECHR. 
In Grogan,166 Advocate-General Van Gerven confirmed what has been observed above, 
referring to Cinetheque: 
"In that case, it was stated that the Court's power of review did not extend to, "an 
area which falls within the jurisdiction of the national legislator", a statement 
which, generally speaking, is true. Yet once a national rule is involved which has 
effects in an area covered by Community law (in this case Article 59 EC) and 
which, in order to be permissible, must be able to be justified under Community 
law with the help of concepts or principles of Community law, then the appraisal 
of that national rule no longer falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
national legislator."167 
165 Ibid, para 42. 
'"Case 159/90 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd (SPUC) v. Stephen Grogan 
and others [1991] ECR 1-4685, [1991] CMLR 849. 
167 Ibid, para. 31. 
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In its judgment the ECJ distinguished ERT, stating that in this case (Grogan) the relevant 
national legislation was outside the scope of Community law. 1 6 8 
It has been suggested that the Cinetheque case is inconsistent both with the later 
jurisprudence in Wachauf and ERT and with what had come before.169 It can be argued, 
however, that the ECJ was effecting a gradual development of its human rights 
jurisdiction. It should be recalled that the ECJ is only competent to rule on the basis of 
the cases that come before it. I f a case relates to national legislation (as in Cinetheque) 
the ECJ must rule on that basis and cannot speculate as to what may happen i f the 
relevant facts were a matter of both Community and national law. Such decisions could 
give rise to sweeping generalisations. Furthermore, the ECJ had to reassure Member 
States, where dealing with national legislation, that it wi l l not start to interfere in areas in 
which it has not been given competence, otherwise Member States would feel that their 
domestic sovereignty was being infringed. On the other hand however, the Community 
is a dynamic organisation, and the ECJ must be able to reflect this. The ECJ does not 
operate exclusively in one field, for example fundamental rights, but must see the 
implications of its judgments for other fields. The dangers of being perceived to create 
even a potential risk of violating fundamental constitutional rights were demonstrated in 
the 1970s. When developing new fields the ECJ always acts with an eye to Member 
State reaction and, fundamentally, to the political climate operating within Europe. This 
is clearly demonstrated by the introduction of "fundamental rights" as principles of 
Community law, as a direct response to the German and Italian Constitutional Courts' 
threat to the supremacy of Community law in the absence of these principles as part of 
Community law. That the effect of being perceived to have overstepped its jurisdiction 
1 6 8 The implications for the Irish Constitution had the matter been held to be within the scope of 
Community law are interesting: would it have been held to conflict with fundamental rights as ensured by 
the Community? Has the ultimate effect of introducing fundamental rights to the Community to protect 
national constitutional rights, been to undermine the national constitutions where they protect values not 
forming part of Community law but which may have effects upon the operation of the economic freedoms 
protected by Community law? 
1 6 9 Coppell and O'Neil "The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously? " (1992) 29 CMLRev 
669-692 c.f. Weiler and Lockhart, " "Taking Rights Seriously " Seriously: The European Court and its 
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence - Part I" (1995) 32 CMLRev 3251-95 and "Part II" (1995) 32 
CMLRev 579-627. 
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could be to severely limit its development is a fact that the ECJ is not able to disregard. 
Thus developments may only be gradual. 
Although the ECJ has now gone far further than the Cinetheque judgment implied, the 
fundamental rule has remained the same: the recurrent question relates to matters outside 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Community, but not within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the national courts. The development of this field has been far-reaching. However the 
ECJ could still, on this basis, maintain that it is acting in the pursuit of the enforcement of 
Community law and that where the enforcement of Community law impinges also on 
matters relating to the ECHR, this must be respected as part of the Community legal 
order. On that ground it is also possible to argue that these cases are a logical 
development of the ECJ's earlier jurisprudence on human rights. As the Community has 
evolved so the considerations of the ECJ have also had to evolve. 
What then falls within the scope of "Community law"? In Konstantinidism Advocate-
General Jacobs suggested that the scope of "Community law" could be very wide indeed, 
stating that any human rights violation suffered by a civis europeus would be per se a 
violation of Community law. This definition was not referred to in the judgment of the 
case, and it remained unclear how far the ECJ would be prepared to go in its 
interpretation of the scope of Community law. This question was revisited recently in 
Kremzow m In 1982 Friedrich Kremzow confessed to murder but later retracted the 
confession. In 1984, however, he was found guilty of murder (and unlawful possession 
of a firearm), sentenced to twenty years imprisonment and committed to an institution for 
mentally i l l criminals. Following a subsequent hearing, at which he was not present (he 
had not requested to attend and the court had not ordered his attendance of its own 
motion), the conviction was upheld but the sentence was amended to life imprisonment in 
an ordinary prison. The European Commission and Court of Human Rights1 7 2 both held 
that, in accordance with Article 6(3)(c) ECHR, Kremzow should have had the 
1 7 0 Case C-1168/91 Konstantinidis v. Stadt Altensteigstandesamt [1993] ECR I-1191,[ 1993] 3 CMLR 401. 
1 7 1 Case C-299/95 Kremzow v. Austria, [1997] I ECR 1-2629, [1997] 3 CMLR 1289. 
1 7 2 Judgment of 21 September 1993, Kremzow v. Austria series A, No. 268-B. 
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opportunity to defend himself in person on appeal. For this violation of his rights he was 
awarded expenses and fees. Following this, Kremzow brought (unsuccessful) 
proceedings for damages and payment of compensation for unlawful detention pursuant 
to Article 5(5) ECHR. The appeals he brought were equally unsuccessful. In an extra-
ordinary appeal Kremzow argued that the violation of the ECHR had not been rectified 
by the proceedings and that the appeals should be resumed to achieve that result. He 
asked the national court to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ, on whether the 
national court was bound by the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. He 
submitted that the case related to the fundamental right of freedom of the person, and the 
civil sanction for its infringement, that is the basis for the exercise of all other freedoms. 
The national court requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling inter alia on whether 
the provisions of the ECHR are part of Community law, which would render them 
subject to interpretation by the ECJ. In its ruling the ECJ initially referred to Opinion 
2/94m, to reaffirm that fundamental rights are an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law. It then confirmed that: "measures are not acceptable within the 
Community which are incompatible with the observance of human rights thus recognised 
and guaranteed" referring in particular at this point to the ERT case.174 The ECJ 
continued, with reference to Grogan:m 
"... where national legislation falls within the field of application of Community 
law the Court, in a reference for a preliminary ruling, must give the national court 
all the guidance as to interpretation necessary to enable it to assess the 
compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights - as laid down in 
particular in the Convention - whose observance the Court ensures. However the 
Court has no such jurisdiction with regard to national legislation lying outside the 
scope of Community law." 
173 Opinion 2/94 Re the Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention [1996] 
ECR1-1759, [1996] 2 CMLR 265. 
174 Supra note 84. 
175 Supra note 166. 
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Finally, the ECJ rejected Kremzow's argument that his rights in relation to freedom of 
movement had been violated, observing that: 
"a purely hypothetical prospect of exercising that right does not justify the 
application of Community Provisions Moreover, Mr Kremzow was 
sentenced for murder and for illegal possession of a fire arm under provisions of 
national law which were not designed to secure compliance with rules of 
Community Law" 1 7 6 . 
Therefore, the ECJ ruled that it was not competent to interpret the ECHR in this case as 
the matter was not genuinely within the field of application of Community law. 
In Kremzow the ECJ has clearly made an attempt to draw a line as to how far the 
interpretation of "scope of Community law" may go. This may allay some of the fears 
expressed as to the "offensive" use of fundamental rights, and the trespass by the ECJ 
into national states' jurisdiction.1 7 7 The approach of the Court in this case is consistent 
with its condemnation of the abuse of Community law provisions in the context of free 
movement of goods.178 
However, although in this case the ECJ appears to be determined not to extend its 
competence without limit, its expansion of its jurisdiction, which has caused so much 
controversy, does exacerbate a problem inherent in the existence of two parallel legal 
systems operating within Europe. As seen above, the Community is not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. The ECJ has thus far refused to 
refer to the case law of the ECHR in its judgments, notwithstanding the fact that its 
Advocates-General have been willing to do so. Thus the possibility arises that the ECJ 
176 Supra note 171,para.s 16-17. 
1 7 7 See Coppell and O'Neill, supra note 169. 
1 7 8 See the "Sunday Trading" jurisprudence Case 169/91 Stoke on Trent City Council and Norwich City 
Council v. B. &Q. Pic. [1992] ECR I- 6635, [1993] 1 CMLR 426 and reaction of the Court in Joined Cases 
C267/91 and 268/91 Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR 1-6097, [1995] CMLR 101. 
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may interpret a provision in such a way as conflicts with the interpretation given by the 
Strasbourg Court. In the event that this occurs, the national court is bound to apply the 
interpretation given by the ECJ, as preliminary rulings are binding upon the referring 
court. 
Such divergent interpretations have occurred. Perhaps the best known example involves 
the Hoechst119 case. This case, like many of the others giving rise to divergent opinions 
in the two courts, related to the rights of a legal person and Article 8 of the ECHR (the 
right to privacy). Although there had been earlier case law relating to Article 8 of the 
ECHR and legal persons, the ECJ had avoided a direct ruling on the extent to which the 
right to privacy can be relied upon by a legal as opposed to a natural person.180 In 
Hoechst the ECJ was explicit that: 
"...although the existence of the fundamental right [to inviolability of the home] 
must be recognised in the Community legal order as a principle common to the 
laws of the Member States in regard to the private dwellings of natural persons, 
the same is not true in regard to undertakings, because there are not 
inconsiderable divergencies between the legal systems of the Member States in 
regard to the nature and degree of protection afforded to business premises 
against intervention by the public authorities. 
No other reference is to be drawn from Article 8(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights which provides that "everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence". The protective scope 
of that article is concerned with the development of man's personal freedom and 
may not therefore be extended to business premises. Furthermore it should be 
noted that there is no case law in the European Court of Human rights on that 
subject."181 
1 7 9 Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst AG v. Commission [1989] ECR 2859. 
1 8 0 See for example National Panasonic supra note 146, Case 5/85 BV and AKZO Chemie UK Ltd v. 
Commission [1986] ECR 2585, [1987] 3 CMLR 716. 
181 Supra note 179, para.s 17-18. 
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It continued, recognising the need to protect any person (natural or legal) from arbitrary 
or disproportionate intervention as a general principle of Community law. The 
interpretation by the ECJ in Hoechst was initially compared with the Strasbourg Court's 
decision in Chappell™1 and criticised on that basis. It has subsequently been observed, 
however, that this is not a good comparison, because although Chappell did relate to the 
applicability of Article 8, the Strasbourg Court, in addition to examining the effect of the 
search upon the company, considered the applicant's private life and home.183 In Niemitz, 
however, the Strasbourg Court (after referring to the ECJ's judgment in Hoechst) was 
explicit that: 
"...More generally, to interpret the words "private life" and "home" as including 
certain professional or business activities or premises would be consonant with 
the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely to protect the individual 
against arbitrary interference by the public authorities . ." 1 8 4 
The Strasbourg Court reaffirmed this position early in 1993.185 Thus there can be little 
doubt that the ECJ's judgment in Hoechst was in conflict with the correct interpretation 
to be given to Article 8 of the ECHR. Advocate-General Darmon, in Orkem, stated 
"This Court may therefore adopt, with respect to provisions of the Convention, an 
interpretation which does not coincide exactly with that given by the Strasbourg 
authorities, in particular the European Court of Human Rights. It s not bound, in 
so far as it does not have systematically to take account, as regards fundamental 
rights under Community law, of the interpretation of the Convention given by the 
Strasbourg authorities."186 
1 8 2 European Court of Human Rights, Chappell Judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A No. 152. 
1 8 3 Lawson, "Confusion and Conflict: Diverging Interpretations of the ECHR in Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg" Lawson and de Blois, 1994. 
1 8 4 European Court of Human Rights, Niemietz Judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A No. 251. 
1 8 5 European Court of Human Rights, Funke, Cremieux and Miailhe, Judgments of 25 February 1993, 
Series A, Nos. 256A, 256B and 256C. 
1 8 6 Case 374/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR 3343, at 3351. 
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The crucial, practical question raised, is whether the protection offered in the 
Community, and ensured by the ECJ, meets in every case, the standard required by the 
ECHR. This is doubtful. Notably, there is no remedy for a complaint against a breach of 
the ECHR by Community institutions. In CM & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany,™1 
The Commision of Human Rights, found the applicant's complaint to be inadmissable on 
the grounds that the possible violation had been committed by the Community, which is 
not a party to the Convention. Germany's responsibility was limited to its fulfilment of 
its international obligation to execute the Community's decision. The Commission on 
Human Rights is clearly keen to avoid becoming involved in areas of Community 
competence, as it could have adopted a stricter approach to the breach of a right of the 
ECHR by a party to it. Demonstrating their commitment to resolve the problem, 
members of the two courts recently met to discuss dual jurisdiction. 
Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Dual Jurisdiction over Human Rights 
Although this problem merits, and has received, fuller discussion than can be given in 
this context it is essential, having raised the problem of divergent interpretations of the 
ECHR by the ECJ and the Strasbourg Court, to make some reference to potential 
solutions to it. Two main proposals have been put forward. Each of these has been 
debated to greater and lesser degrees. The first, and perhaps most obvious option is 
accession, the second is that the Community devises its own Bi l l of Rights. There is a 
third, more novel option, suggested by Toth, 1 8 8 that the Community should incorporate 
the contents of the ECHR into Community law and withdraw from the Convention. 
Accession by the Community to the European Convention on Human Rights 
Accession has been debated for almost as long as the ECJ has been considering 
fundamental rights. In 1976189 the Commission stated that it considered the Community 
' CM. & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application no. 13258/87 
'Toth, "The European Community and Human Rights: The Way Forward" (1997) 34 CMLRev 491. 
' Report of 4 February 1976 from Commission to Parliament, Supplement 5/76 - Bull. EC. 
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to be bound by the ECHR, and that there was no necessity for the Community to formally 
accede to it. However in 1979 the Commission revised this opinion, publishing a 
memorandum on the accession of the Community to the ECHR. 1 9 0 In this it stated that 
the problems in not having a clear Bil l of Rights were such that the Commission now 
considered accession to be desirable. The introduction to the memorandum states: 
"The Commission believes that the best way of replying to the need to reinforce 
the protection of fundamental rights at Community level, at the present stage 
consists in the Community formally adhering to the European Convention .." 
It continues that, although in the long term the Community should "endeavour to 
complete the Treaties by a catalogue of fundamental rights specially adapted to the 
exercise of its powers" the best protection for individual citizens, until such time as the 
Member States can agree on the definition of "fundamental rights", is accession. At 
paragraph 7 it states that: 
"the decisive factor in this view is that the ECHR and the protection of 
fundamental rights ensured by the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
essentially have the same aim, namely the protection of a heritage of fundamental 
and human rights considered inalienable by those European States organised on a 
democratic basis. The protection of this Western European heritage should 
ultimately be uniform and accordingly assigned, as regards the Community also, 
to those bodies set up specifically for this purpose." 
It is perhaps difficult to reconcile this with the opinion expressed repeatedly throughout 
the memorandum, that accession should not be an obstacle to a Community catalogue of 
fundamental rights.191 In the event of accession, an additional Community catalogue 
would run the risk of being at the least superfluous, and could lead to confusion as to the 
1 9 0 Commission Memorandum "Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human 
Rights" Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 2/79, Adopted by the Commission on 4 April 
1979. 
191 Supra note 190, para. 8. 
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appropriate legal basis on which to ground acts or actions relating to rights. Even i f the 
Community catalogue related to "secondary" rights, not covered by the ECHR but 
relevant to the Community, there is potential for conflict unless such a catalogue is 
strictly defined. 
A key factor in the change of opinion of the Commission between 1976 and 1979 was the 
realisation of the untenable position of Member States in the event that the Community 
introduced a provision which contravened the ECHR. Because the Community itself is 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg Court, the Member State would be held 
directly responsible for the breach of the ECHR i f it implemented the Community law 
provision. In turn, the Community would have no opportunity to respond to the 
complaint against its provision in proceedings in Strasbourg. It was also believed inter 
alia that accession would strengthen the institutions of the Community when acting in the 
field of fundamental rights protection. 
Among the arguments against accession considered by the Commission in 1979, was the 
fact that the rights contained in the ECHR are not really relevant to the Community, and 
would merely delay the Community in addressing the real issue: the problem of 
adequately guaranteeing fundamental rights relevant to the Community. The 
Commission rejected both of these claims, observing the relevance of various provisions 
of the ECHR. It was rather less than convincing in its consideration of the fact that the 
ECHR is only open to accession by sovereign states and that the Community could not 
exercise its procedural rights. It suggested that it may not be appropriate for the 
Community to "seek full and equal membership in all respects", stating that "accession 
must serve to extend the range of legal remedies available in the event of violations of 
fundamental rights by the Community". 
Whatever its merits, the Commission's memorandum failed to bring the Community any 
closer to accession. The European Parliament, in 1989, adopted a Declaration of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (12 April 1989). This was followed by a renewed 
attempt by the Commission to bring the Community to accede to the ECHR. 
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In 1994 the Parliament produced its own Resolution on the accession of the Community 
to the Convention.192 It based the need for this upon the fact that there "wil l be gaps in 
the system for protecting fundamental rights until such time as the Community is subject 
to the monitoring procedures provided for under the ECHR in the same way as its 
Member States".193 It observed that the increasing competence of the Community leads 
to an increased risk of interference in fundamental rights and freedoms. While the 
Parliament recognised the political, institutional and legal problems inherent in accession 
it saw no reason why the ECJ should not be subject to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
Court, and envisaged accession being possible upon the legal basis of Articles 235 EC 
and F(2) and K(2)(l) of the TEU. 
Shortly after this, the Council of the European Union requested an Opinion 1 9 4 from the 
ECJ, on the possibility of accession to the ECHR by the EU. The Opinion was delivered 
on March 28 1996.195 
In brief, the ECJ stated that: 
"As Community law now stands, the Community has no competence to accede to 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms because no provision of the Treaty confers on the Community 
institutions in a general way, the power to enact rules concerning human rights or 
to conclude international agreements in this field and such accession cannot be 
brought about by recourse to Article 235 of the Treaty."196 
192 Resolution on Community Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights OJ 1994. C44/32 
18. 
193 Ibid, para. 1 C44/33. 
1 9 4 Pursuant to Article 228(6) EC. 
195 Opinion 2/94, supra note 173. 
196 Supra note 173, para. 6. 
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The Court then stated that accession would have such a profound effect upon the system 
of protection of human rights in Europe and equally profound institutional implications, 
that such a change would require the amendment of the Treaty. It was categorical that 
Article 235 could not be used as the legal basis for accession, contrary to the opinion of 
the Parliament. Its reasoning in this was that Article 235 can only be used to achieve the 
existing objectives of the Treaty; it cannot be used to widen the powers or competence of 
the Treaty or, effectively, to amend the Treaty. 
Thus from the Community perspective accession to the ECHR is not an option, unless the 
required amendment is made to the Treaty. However, as Noreen Burrows has observed 
"Treaty amendment is a long and complex business and .... there is no consensus on how 
to ensure protection of human rights in the Community."197 It can be argued that i f there 
is no such consensus then this itself provides ample evidence to support the ECJ in its 
opinion that the necessary powers have not been conferred upon the Community in this 
field. Burrows however questions the lack of application of the doctrine of parallelism in 
this context: " I f Article 164 allows the Court to recognise general principles of human 
rights in the internal legal order why does it not provide a basis for action in the external 
sphere?" She continues, speculating that perhaps in this the ECJ is motivated by its 
desire to guard its jurisdiction, reluctant to submit to the jurisdiction of the Strasbourg 
Court which would very likely be part and parcel with accession.198 
It is possible that the ECJ is protective of its jurisdiction. However, it is submitted that 
there is a reason why the doctrine of parallelism does not apply. As has been seen, the 
doctrine of parallelism is applied where the Community has an internal power, and where 
application of this power externally is essential to the achievement of one of the 
objectives of the Community. The Court has established that it is competent to uphold 
human rights within the Community. It has done this, however, as a reflection of the 
values of the Member States, which should be protected. Its powers in this sphere are 
1 9 7 Noreen Burrows "Question of Community Accession to the European Convention Determined" (1997) 
ELRev 58, at 61. 
1 9 8 The debate as to the potential relationship between the two courts, although interesting, is not strictly 
relevant, in the light of the Opinion, and is not one which can be properly discussed here. 
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limited to within that specific context199 which does not equate to an objective of the 
Community. 
At this point the question referred to briefly above, as to whether the Council of Europe 
would be inclined, or able to make the necessary amendment to the ECHR to enable the 
Union to accede (even in the event that the necessary amendments are made to the EC 
Treaty) should be recalled. It becomes ever more unlikely as the membership of the 
Council expands: persuading the forty, very different, member states to agree to the 
necessary changes could prove difficult, i f not impossible. 
Development of a European Union Catalogue of Rights 
The second significant proposal to resolve the problem of dual jurisdiction is that the 
Union (or Community) develops its own Catalogue of Human Rights. The limitations of 
this are clear however. Initially, it might be difficult to find a consensus on the nature of 
rights to be included; subsequently, any overlap with the ECHR would raise serious 
jurisdictional problems. Where a conflict arose between rights under the different 
systems, demanding a balance to be struck, which jurisdiction would be appropriate? A 
further factor to bear in mind is the dynamism of the Community: had a list of rights been 
in existence throughout the 1970s and 80s, it could have severely limited the 
developmental approach of the ECJ which proved so important in this field. In the 1970s 
it was believed that the Community was not and would not be concerned with human 
rights. That being no longer the case, there may still be rights declared to be outside the 
scope of the Community. Yet in ten years time, however, perceptions may be very 
different. Cataloguing the rights to be protected by the Community would have to be 
done in a manner which does not limit future rights to considered. These factors taken 
together call into question the purpose and merit in developing a Catalogue of Rights. 
This will be discussed in more detail below. 
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Withdrawal from the Council of Europe and Development of a Union Catalogue of 
Rights 
Toth has proposed a novel solution.200 In the light of Opinion 2/94 he suggests the 
Community has three options: the continuation of the status quo, the development of a 
Community Catalogue of Human Rights, or Accession to the Convention. He rejects the 
first, stating that the protection of human rights now deserves more "concrete, tangible 
material" than the protection by general principles of law. The second he rejects on the 
grounds that it would undermine the authority of the Convention, it would establish a 
dual system of human rights protection in Europe, the drafting of it would be very 
difficult, and, finally that it would require Treaty amendment. Accession he rejects for 
various grounds: inter alia the internal and external consequences of accession, and its 
ultimate incompatibility with the Treaty. Having dispensed with his three "options" Toth 
proposes "the solution". This takes as its starting point the achievement of enlargement 
of the Union, (to 26 states). On enlargement the Union: 
" 1 . [should incorporate] all of the substantive provisions of the European 
Convention into the Treaty of European Union as a separate Title.... 
2. [should extend] the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the EC Treaty to 
this new Title and related protocols 
3. [Member States should withdraw] from the European Convention in 
accordance with Article 65 thereof'2 0 1 
There is a fundamental practical problem with this. From a purely Union perspective 
Toth has not explained how agreement should be reached to achieve the necessary 
amendment of the Treaty. Given the existing lack of consensus on the approach the 
Community should take to protection of human rights in a Union of 15 states, it would be 
no small matter to achieve such consensus in an enlarged Union of 26 states. The 
assumption that this wi l l simply happen thus appears overly optimistic. 
0 AG Toth, 'The European Union and Human Rights: The way forward" 34 CMLRev (1997) 491-529. 
'Supra note 199 atp.512. 
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A further problem relates to the protection of human rights in Europe, but not necessarily 
within the Union. The Council of Europe has forty members at present. The Court of 
Human Rights has little in the way of sanctions that can be brought to bear upon 
members who breach their obligations under the Convention. The press and public 
opinion are vital tools of pressure. The question that Toth fails to address, is how to 
protect human rights in the states which do not accede to the Union. In the case of, for 
example, Iceland, the shrinking of the Council of Europe may not pose great risks to 
future adherence to European, and International, human rights standards. In less stable 
democracies, however, any pressure that can be wielded is of importance. Currently, 
adherence to the Convention on Human Rights is a condition of accession to the Union: 
this condition would no longer be possible to demand in the event that the members of 
the Community withdrew from the Council of Europe. It might very well still be 
possible to demand adherence to universal standards; however, the little control and 
inspection previously exercised by the European Commission of Human Rights, (now the 
Court of Human Rights alone) an independent investigator, would be lost. It may be 
asked of what relevance this is to the Union i f the protection of rights internally is more 
firmly established. To answer that demands recollection of why the ECHR was created, 
and the objective of the Council of Europe: to maintain stability in Europe. Toth's 
proposal may seek to establish a clearer basis for fundamental rights protection within the 
Union, but the consequent loss of control or pressure in the rest of Europe could lead to a 
reduction in the protection of human rights in Europe, and a loss of stability in Europe. 
That this is not mere speculation can be seen in the attitude of certain states who have 
adhered to the ECHR, but very likely only as a step to joining the Union, for example 
Turkey. Without the incentive of Union accession they might be unlikely to respect the 
standards of the ECHR to even the extent they do currently. More fundamentally, the 
Community is clearly now undertaking a more active role in the protection of human 
rights internationally. The evidence for this is clear in its inclusion of the human rights 
and democracy clause in its agreements with third states. Withdrawal from the Council 
of Europe, with its consequent upheaval in the protection of human rights in Europe, and 
weakening of the protection of human rights in the parts of Europe where they are at their 
most vulnerable, could hardly be seen to be consistent with this new international role. I f 
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the Community is to appear sincere in its commitment to this field then it must not do 
anything that wi l l weaken the existing framework for the protection of human rights. 
In all likelihood Toth's "solution" wil l remain only a proposal. It does, however, raise 
questions about the long term future and stability of Europe, and serves as a reminder that 
the wider implications of any proposals to address the existent problems in human rights 
protection in Europe should be examined. 
Having considered the three proposals, it is clear that, unless some system of preliminary 
ruling can be established, whereby the ECJ could request an interpretation of a specific 
provision from the Strasbourg Court, without being formally bound, the problem of 
conflicting interpretations between the two jurisdictions wi l l continue. Even this, 
however, would require amendment of the Treaty, so any solution to the problem of dual 
jurisdiction clearly requires that the Member States find a consensus on how they want 
the Union to approach fundamental rights in the future. 
In this debate it is surprising that the question of "prior obligation" has not been raised. 
I f the reasoning applied in Centro-Com202 to the relationship of the Community with the 
UN Charter were to be applied also to the Community's relationship with the ECHR, the 
Convention would clearly take precedence. I f the Community is bound by virtue of the 
prior obligation, it is arguable that the Community institutions, including the Court would 
also be bound. This, however, would still be insufficient to give the Community 
competence to take an active role in this sphere. 
As it stands the Court is doing as it has done in other fields, where it has adopted as 
Community law obligations entered into by the Member States at international level.2 0 3 
In such cases, however, the Court is competent to rule on the agreement with a non-
member state only in relation to its internal effect. It has no jurisdiction over the partner 
state. 
2 0 2 Case C-124/95 R. v. HM Treasury and the Bank of England ex parte Centro-Com Sri [1997] ECR1-81, 
[1997] 1 CMLR555. 
2 0 3 See Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 5: The Protection of Human Rights Offered Within and By the 
Community: an Analysis 
As has been seen above, the Court of Justice systematically developed the protection of 
fundamental rights as a matter of Community competence and concern. The other 
institutions were, however, by no means silent on the matter. Broadly, they supported the 
activity of the ECJ, as is particularly clear from the Joint declaration of 1977.204 
The European Parliament (Parliament) in particular has always been a strong advocate of 
fundamental rights protection at Community level. In its Round Table Proceedings as 
early as 1978 the suggestion was made that Community concern in this field should be 
extended to its dealings with third states. Although the suggestion was rejected at this 
early stage, Parliament has, since 1983, produced 2-yearly reports on the world-wide 
human rights situation and EU human rights policy. Albeit these have had limited 
influence on the substance of foreign policy, they are important in the heightened profile 
they have given to this issue. Similarly, although parliamentary resolutions205 are not 
recognised to influence the Union's foreign policy actions, they can exploit Parliament's 
Community powers.206 The Parliamentary Working Group on human rights was replaced 
in 1984 with a sub-committee. The sub-committees on "External Economic Relations" 
and "Development and Cooperation" play an additional role in this field. A further 
weapon of the Parliament has been its ability to take unilateral action, such as inter-
parliamentary meetings with third states, and political dialogue. 
Thus although prima facie the Parliament's power is limited, it has a history of support 
for this issue both as an internal and an external concern. There may not be results 
directly attributable to its activity, but the underlying effects of its interest should not be 
2 0 4 Joint Declaration, Supra note 129. 
2 0 5 For example Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the European Union, 17 February 1998 
Europe Documents No. 2074/75 26 February 1998. 
2 0 6 For example the threat to withdraw approval for the Customs Union Agreement with Turkey if the 
Turkish human rights situation did not improve. See Fouwels, Martine "The European Union's Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and Human Rights " (1997) NQHR 15/3,291. 
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underestimated. Of practical importance was Parliament's initiative to put together, as a 
distinct chapter, the budget headings relating specifically to the promotion of human 
rights.2 0 7 In December 1997 Parliament issued a report on "setting up a single co-
ordinating structure within the Commission responsible for human rights and 
democratisation"208 focussing strongly on the need for consistency in the approach and 
action of the Community. 
The Council also was vocal in its promotion of human rights throughout this period. In 
addition to its part in the joint declaration, its (unilateral) Declaration on Democracy of 
1978 states that; "respect for and maintenance of representative democracy and human 
rights in each member state are essential elements of membership of the European 
Communities". The Council since then has consistently upheld its commitment to the 
protection of human rights and democracy,209 even going beyond declarations of 
commitment with undertakings to pursue the protection of human rights through the 
international action of the Community.210 In 1987 the Council established a Working 
Group on human rights, which, however, considers matters only after they have been 
discussed in regional fora, the OSCE or UN working groups, and wil l not override the 
decisions of such groups. 
The European Commission (Commission) adopted an early position in favour of the 
protection of human rights within the Community, submitting consistently before the 
ECJ that the Community is bound by the ECHR. There has been a Commission unit on 
Human Rights and democratisation within DG 1A since 1988, prior to which there was a 
Secretariat General. 
2 0 7 Chapter B7/70 "European Initiative for Democracy and the Protection of Human Rights". 
2 0 8 Lenz Report, PE 220.735/fin. 
2 0 9 See for example Statement on Human Rights: Foreign Ministers meeting in the Framework of European 
political framework and Council, 21 July 1986, Reproduced in "The European Community and human 
rights " Christine Duparc, Commission of the European Communities, October 1992, Council Declaration 
(on Human Rights) of 29 June 1991 (on human rights democracy and development). 
2 1 0 Council Declaration of 29/06/91 ibid. 
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In relation to developing countries the Commission stated in 1991 that 
"the time has come ... to feature human rights and democracy more prominently 
in cooperation policy guidelines and at the same time to ensure that political 
reactions to situations where questions of human rights or democracy are at stake 
take due account of the aims and specific concerns of development cooperation.... 
... the Community wi l l give priority to fundamental human rights, since these are 
universal and completely independent of any particular type of society"2" 
This is consistent with earlier attempts to include a "human rights clause" in Lome. It is 
significant, however, that the Commission was silent as regards the Community's 
external policy on human rights in the wider context until 1995, when it issued two 
communications on the subject.212 
More recently, the Commission presented a proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
Development and Consolidation of Democracy and the Rule of Law and Respect for 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.213 This proposal, which elucidates the 
approach of the Commission, is discussed below. 
Without comparing the approaches of the different institutions, which do have 
distinctions, there are certain observations that can be made. First, all the institutions 
advocate that the Community has a role to play, and that the protection of human rights 
internationally should be, and is, one of its concerns. Second, this is often couched in 
terms of a "duty" of the Community. Thirdly, there is a recognised need for the 
Community to adopt a consistent stance on this issue in its dealings with third states. 
2 1 1 Commission Communication to Council and Parliament on Human Rights, Democracy and 
Development Co-operation Policy: 19/3/91 (Information Memo 91/20). 
2 1 2 "On the Inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the 
Community and third countries", and "The European Union and the External dimension of human rights 
policy". 
2 1 3 COM (97) 357 final. 
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Inherent within this is a requirement that the institutions co-ordinate their approaches to 
individual third states, such as China, as well as that there should be some consistency in 
the treatment different states receive for similar violations of human rights standards. 
This raises the question of what the Community intends by its commitment to protect 
human rights internationally. 
Whether they are Parliamentary Reports, proposals for legislation or communications the 
publications of the institutions all refer to the Community's external human rights policy 
and commitment in terms of international, universal standards.214 It is interesting then to 
consider what falls within the scope of these standards. Despite the Community's 
commitment to the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights expressed in 
international conventions (the Commission has recognised the importance of this, 
although it accepts the difficulties for Courts in monitoring these),215 only an examination 
of its practice will reveal whether the Community's external commitment is indeed as 
wide as its internal "competence." 
The internal competence remains well within the Community's conferred powers and in 
Kremzow the Court indicated that it has no intention of extending this further. This 
means that rights protected still relate primarily to economic issues. Therefore the 
Community is apparently accepting limits upon its internal competence. Externally, the 
Community is acting essentially as a concerned international actor. However, as has 
been seen, there is little to support its assumption of competence in this field, other than 
in relation to development cooperation. A further problem arises here: the Community is 
acting to promote universal human rights standards as expressed in international treaties, 
yet how should these be enforced? It would be possible to use the enforcement 
mechanism provided against an individual state which is party to the relevant convention. 
The Member States of the Community could collectively choose to do so. Yet surely 
such action would normally come within the remit of the CFSP, and therefore the Union, 
2 1 4 See examples in Appendix D. 
2 1 5 Memo 91/20 atp.2. 
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particularly i f decided upon inter-governmentally. It is only the existence of the 
Community agreement that gives the Community competence, but this is only as 
legitimate as the inclusion of this clause in the first place. Finally, how would it be 
possible to enforce such standards against the Community, which is not a party to these 
conventions? 
The question, which must now be addressed, is how the human rights and democracy 
clause, in the general trade context, fits into the Community's competence? Is its 
inclusion a legitimate exercise of parallel powers? This is of course dependent on the 
extent of the Community's internal power, and has been referred to briefly above. The 
internal competence of the Community in this field is restricted: first to matters falling 
within its competence under the treaty, as has been seen most recently in Konstantinidis; 
secondly, to the enforcement of member states' human rights obligations, by which all 
the states are bound alongside their Community obligations. This can be distinguished 
from the Community-third state relationship, by virtue of the acceptance by Community 
member states of the jurisdiction of the ECJ, and the unique nature of the legal system 
created by the Community. Thus the Community's internal power does not extend to the 
creation and enforcement of new human rights obligations; rather it respects certain 
standards, originating in the Member States, in the exercise of its powers. This is 
consistent with the fact that Community competence is only that which is attributed to it 
by the Member States, all of whom were already signatories of ECHR when competence 
was transferred. It can be argued that they could only transfer competence insofar as it 
would not conflict with existing obligations in another field. 
In relation to the Community-third-state relationship the third state may also be a party to 
the same international human rights conventions, however, the Community itself is not a 
party to these treaties, therefore it has no responsibility to enforce these standards in other 
states, nor has it any jurisdiction to do so. Nor do these treaties constitute the creation of 
a new legal system. Therefore, the existent basis for Community competence in relation 
to human rights internally is absent in the external context. 
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A further requirement of parallel powers is that the action be necessary for the 
achievement of an objective of the Community. The TEU placed human rights within 
the Union, and the ECJ in Opinion 2/94 was explicit that they are not within the 
Community's competence. Although Art. 130 EC refers to the Community's "general 
objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of 
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms" there are two factors which suggest 
that the Community does not have a general power in this area. The first is that Art. 130u 
specifies "Community policy in this area shall contribute to .. ." 2 I 6 so suggesting that this 
requirement of Community policy is not universal. The second is, it is submitted, that 
the Community's power to uphold human rights comes from the shared traditions of the 
Member States, and a need to prevent the Member States from avoiding their 
"constitutional" obligations through transfer of powers. Thus it is not as such a general 
objective of the Community itself. Parallel powers can only arise in relation to specific 
objectives to be pursued by the Community per se. This distinction could prevent the 
internal power of the Community (to uphold human rights) from giving rise to a parallel 
external power. 
Will the introduction of the Amsterdam Treaty (ToA) change this conclusion? It is 
possible that the substantiation of the commitment to human rights in the Community 
would be such as to give rise to a parallel power. I f this were the case there could be no 
argument about the legitimacy of the human rights clause in international agreements 
concluded after the ToA enters into force. This would still leave something of a void, 
however, in relation to the treaties already concluded. 
2 1 6 Emphasis added. 
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Conclusions To Part II 
Despite the absence of an express power to act in relation to human rights protection the 
Community has consistently developed its competence in this field. This development 
was achieved initially by the Court through its determination to give effect to Community 
law and the rights derived from it. Notwithstanding the early belief that there was no 
overlap with human rights considerations in the EEC, nor indeed of any other rights than 
those set out in the Treaty, the Court gradually established means by which the 
obligations of the Treaty could be enforced, and rights arising from these to be protected. 
From consideration of the (economic) rights included in the Treaty, the Court moved on 
to include rights deriving from shared principles of the Member States. Later, the ECHR 
was accepted as guidance in the identification of shared principles. The terminology 
used by the Court remained static: rights to be protected are still described as 
"fundamental" although this now includes the human rights initially not perceived to 
come within this categorisation. Furthermore, "human rights" also now include the 
economic and social rights not initially perceived as being within that categorisation. 
This wide definition (or lack of it) has become part of the Community legal order. 
Although this demonstrates that human rights should always be determined according to 
context, it has not led to clarity in the understanding of fundamental or, specifically, 
human rights in the Community. 
The dual jurisdiction of the ECJ and ECHR was unforeseeable when the Community was 
founded and the problems arising from it have yet to be resolved. The Court has shown 
itself to be willing to ensure that the Member States enforce their international 
obligations, in this as in other areas, but that it will not permit misuse of these 
fundamental rights standards for ulterior motives. While this reassurance was necessary, 
there is also perhaps a need that a genuine rights issue should not necessarily be 
interpreted from an economic perspective. Yet this is inevitable as long as the 
Community's primary objectives remain economic and such issues are not the subject of 
an objective arbiter. 
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This is not a problem which wil l be easy to overcome. It is unlikely that it would be 
politically acceptable to the Member States (and institutions) of the Union to hand over 
jurisdiction to the European Court of Human Rights in these fields. Such handover 
would indicate that human rights take precedence, even within the framework of a 
fundamentally economic organisation. It may be paradoxical that the EU has been 
unable to do so given that all the Member States of the EU are bound individually. Even 
i f the Community itself is bound by the ECHR by virtue of its conferred powers this does 
not eliminate the problem of divergent interpretations, or of the inability to enforce the 
ECHR as against the Community. 
It is submitted that in the resolution of this problem the Community must consider the 
wider perspective, and the international role which it purports to ful f i l in the protection of 
human rights. The fulfilment of this role wil l require credibility in the field: such 
credibility can only be attained through consistent action, which must begin within 
Europe. This requirement does not only relate to ruling out proposals such as Toth's. 
Consistency of approach must also be achieved, including in the approach of the different 
Community institutions, as well as the establishment of transparency in the Community's 
external relations. 
However the general competence established by the ECJ belies the distinction between 
internal and external protection. Internally, the Community now guarantees the rights, 
including economic and social, laid down in the ECHR, and arising from the shared 
constitutional provisions of the Member States. It is unlikely that the doctrine of 
parallelism could be applied in these circumstances. Externally, the Community appears 
to be concerned only with gross violations of human rights, affecting the physical 
integrity of the individual and violations of democratic procedure. There is no shame in 
this distinction per se; in pragmatic terms it may even be inevitable. The Community 
lays itself open to criticism, however, in the fact that this distinction is reflected in neither 
the terminology used, nor uniformly in the approach adopted by the Community to its 
negotiations. 
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To be effective in its external action the Community must demonstrate two things: that it 
is clear which rights it intends to protect and that it is consistent in its approach to third 
states. The achievement of the first will assist in the achievement of the second. 
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Part I I I : The Human Rights and Democracy Clause: The Practical Experience 
Chapter 6: The Legal Basis - A Challenge of Form not Substance 
Case C-268/94 Portugal v. Council and Commission of the European Union 
It has been established that the European Community (EC or Community), possessing 
full legal personality, has a role in international relations. It has also been established 
that states (and legal persons such as the Community) have the power to take action 
against other states on grounds of violation of universal human rights. Therefore, under 
international law, the Community is in a position to act for the protection of human rights 
in other states. The international law position is irrelevant without internal community 
competence. It has been established, however, that the Community is competent to act 
internally to uphold human rights, and that in relation to development cooperation this 
competence extends externally. 
The correct legal basis for this, in the context of development cooperation agreements, 
was tested in Portugal v. Council111 where the Portuguese Government contested the use 
of Articles 113, 130y and 228 EC as bases for a development cooperation agreement. 
Portugal challenged the legal basis used on several counts, but particularly regarding the 
human rights clause. The first Article of the contested agreement provides: 
"Respect for human rights and democratic principles is the basis of cooperation 
between the Contracting Parties and for the provisions of this Agreement, and it 
constitutes an essential element of the Agreement."218 
2 1 7Case 268/94, Portugal v. Council and Commission [1996] ECR 6177, [1997] 3 CMLR 331. 
2 1 8 Article 1(1), Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and the Republic of India on 
Partnership and Development. OJ 1994 L 223/23. 
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Article 1(2) continues that "the principle objective of the agreement is to enhance and 
develop, through dialogue and partnership, the various aspects of cooperation between 
the Contracting Parties" Article 130u EC provides in the second paragraph that: 
"Community policy in this area [development cooperation] shall contribute to the 
general objective of developing and supporting democracy and the rule of law, 
and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
Article 130y gives the Community (and Member States) the competence to conclude 
agreements with third states in this sphere. 
Significantly, Portugal at no time challenged the insertion of this clause itself: issue was 
taken only with the legal basis upon which this was done. The Portuguese view was that 
Article 130y is a fitting legal basis on which to conclude a cooperation agreement, in 
which respect for human rights is prescribed merely as a general objective. However the 
agreement with India goes further: respect for human rights constitutes an essential 
element of the agreement. The consequences of that particular characterisation are not 
stated, therefore the implication must be that the Community may resort to certain means 
of action which normally can be based solely on Article 235. 
Portugal argued that because the agreement permits action normally only possible after 
unanimous consent has been given, it should be concluded on the basis of Article 235.2 1 9 
"The Council, in its submissions, disputed Portugal's argument, arguing that the definition 
of respect for human rights as an essential element of the agreement is based directly on 
Article 130u, as it allows the Community to terminate or suspend the cooperation 
agreement in the event of a gross violation of the rights the Community is seeking to 
protect. Additionally, it argued that the Portuguese Government's distinction between 
Article 130u and 130y and 130w is artificial and that the result of this distinction is 
paradoxical because it implies that any action of which the objective is to protect human 
rights, consistent with Article 130u, must be carried out on the basis of Article 235. Both 
2 1 9 In contrast the Danish Government proposed that Art. 235 would be appropriate only if the main 
purpose of the Agreement was to safeguard human rights, which is not the case here. 
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the Commission and Denmark agreed with the Council, that Article 1 is entirely 
legitimate. The Advocate-General, recalling the case law of the Court concerning the 
protection of human rights, as well as Art F(2), stated that, for consistency, the same 
approach should be applied to development cooperation: 
"Policy in this sector is to 'contribute' to the general objective ... of respecting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. In other words, cooperation requires the 
observance of democratic principles and the guarantee of the rights that apply in 
the State co-operating with the Community."220 
Having reviewed the relationship between the protection of human rights and 
development cooperation, the Advocate-General moved on to discuss whether the human 
rights clause 
"as formulated in Article 1 of the Agreement, may form part of an agreement 
concluded in accordance with Article 130y.... The inclusion of a clause of that 
nature .... is specifically intended to adjust cooperation policy in line with respect 
for human rights, in accordance with Treaty guidelines...and it is designed to 
allow the Community to exercise the right to terminate the Agreement, in 
accordance with Article 60 of the Vienna Convention ..." 2 2 1 
He then continued that i f proper account is to be taken of the importance the Community 
attaches to human rights in the field of development cooperation, the democracy clause 
"must indeed be deemed necessary i f development cooperation policy is to be lawfully 
pursued."222 The Court in its Judgment is equally clear; 
0 Para. 26 of the Opinion. 
1 Para. 28 of the Opinion. 
2 Para. 29 of the Opinion. 
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"to adapt cooperation policy to respect for human rights necessarily entails 
establishing a certain connection between those matters whereby one of them is 
made subordinate to the other."223 
Peers disagrees with the Court in this assessment, arguing that: 
"there are strong policy arguments for making development policy subordinate to 
human rights, and the Member States and the Community may well wish to 
accept such arguments; but it does not follow that the Treaty makes development 
policy subject to human rights." 2 2 4 
He does acknowledge that the practical effect of this is limited, given its conformity with 
existing practice but finds that, as a result of the Court's 'judicial creativity': 
"Effectively the Portugal judgment inserts an essential elements clause into the 
EC Treaty. Thus, while development policy agreements will no longer be subject 
to the unanimous view of Member States that a particular state has an acceptable 
human rights policy, the agreements wil l remain subject to the requirement that 
the Community's policy protect human rights."2 2 5 
Thus now, whereas it is legitimate for the Community to conclude a development 
agreement without unanimity, it is possible that i f the proposed partner state has a 
questionable record on human rights, it will be impossible to conclude such an 
agreement. 
The question left unanswered is whether the implications of this judgment can have a 
positive or negative effect upon the protection of human rights in third states. Where a 
development agreement is concluded, the Community acquires a stick with which to beat 
2 2 3 Para 26 of the Judgment. 
224 Portugal v. Commission, Case Note [1998] 35 CMLRev 539-555, at p.550. 
225 Supra note 224 at p.554. 
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its partner state should the need arise: there are tangible benefits the partner state would 
lose i f the agreement were suspended in accordance with the essential elements clause. 
On the other hand, i f no agreement has been concluded, the third state wil l have nothing 
to lose i f it violates human rights, unless it values the importance of potential benefits 
such as might accrue under a development agreement. Which, i f either of these, is the 
greater incentive, remains to be seen. 
It is crucial to note however, that these powers are limited to the context of development 
cooperation and at no point in this judgment does the Court suggest there is a wider 
power here for the Community. It is possible that the Court's reluctance to develop this 
as a wider power, reflects different factors. Principally, the Court is an institution of the 
Community and has no jurisdiction over the Common Foreign Policy. 2 2 6 The Member 
States' decision to maintain the development of Foreign Policy as an inter-governmental 
matter, outside the Community, appears to be deliberate. Politically therefore, it seems 
likely that the Court does not at this point consider it appropriate to go further. 
Significantly, it was not necessary that the Court address the question of a wider 
Community power to resolve the particular case. The basis of Community competence to 
include this clause in the context of trade agreements is not addressed. The Community 
may claim it to be in the interests of consistency, but i f this is the sole basis of inclusion, 
it is certainly acting ultra vires and infringing upon the competence of the Union. 
The ECJ has been vital in establishing the competency of the Community in this sphere: 
first, the extent of Community powers to conclude international agreements generally; 
secondly, the proper legal basis upon which to conclude an international agreement 
within this sphere; and thirdly, the importance of human rights within the Community. 
These alone could give rise to questions relating to the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on 
this matter. 
Article L, TEU. 
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Chapter 7: Opposition from the Partner State - The External Challenge 
Following the defeat of the internal challenge to the legal basis for the inclusion of the 
human rights and democracy clause in international development cooperation 
agreements, the Community has successfully negotiated agreements with many 
countries.227 In these, not all of which relate to development cooperation, respect for 
human rights and democracy constitutes an essential element. The success of this policy 
has not been unmitigated however, and during the period 1996-97 two series of 
negotiations were particularly striking. Both Australia and Mexico initially opposed the 
insertion of a human rights and democracy clause, objecting in particular to the non-
execution clause. Both states felt that such provisions had no place in a framework 
cooperation agreement. 
Australia 
The negotiations with Australia commenced in January 1996 with the Commission 
proposal for a new framework agreement with Australia. It was envisaged that alongside 
the trade and cooperation agreement, the framework agreement could also handle the 
political aspects of EU-Australia relations, in a separate joint declaration.228 However, 
eighteen months later, Australia and the EU concluded a Joint Declaration,229 not a 
binding framework cooperation agreement. The speeches of the signatories relating to 
the Declaration give some insight into the issues which played a part in the negotiations: 
"The EU and Australia are close partners culturally, economically and politically. 
The EU is Australia's biggest trading partner and for its part Australia is seen 
increasingly as a vital bridgehead into the Asian market for European Companies. 
2 2 7 For example Vietnam, OJ 1996 L136/28; Mercosur, OJ 1996 L69/1; Korea, OJ 1996 C188; Nepal OJ 
1996L137/96. 
2 2 8 IP/96/100, of 31/01/96. 
2 2 9 Joint declaration on relations between the E U and Australia OJ [1997] C97/213. See IP/97/572 "EU 
and Australia sign declaration on closer ties ". 
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Australia plays a unique role in the Asia-Pacific region, which makes it all the 
more important to maintain and further develop its relations with Australia in the 
coming years."230 
References to human rights and democracy are not lacking in the Joint Declaration. The 
Preamble refers to the parties "shared commitments to the respect and promotion of 
human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law which underpin our 
internal and international policies", the Common Goals include the "determination to 
build upon our partnership in order to: support democracy, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms..." and to further these goals we wil l : 
"enhance our dialogue, both bilaterally and in the relevant international fora, in 
particular on the following areas: the protection and promotion of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In this respect we wil l consult bilaterally and within the 
framework of the relevant bodies of the UN, especially the UNCHR, on Human 
rights issues in general and, in particular on how to advance our shared objectives 
of promoting human rights internationally." 
Such is the commitment of the parties to human rights and democracy. Therefore why 
were these commitments given in a declaration which is, fundamentally, non-binding, 
rather than in the framework of a legally binding agreement including an essential 
elements clause, which would accord with normal Community practice? 
This question may only be answered by examining statements made by the negotiating 
parties and other interested groups over the eighteen months. The Australian 
Government was consistently opposed to the inclusion of the human rights and 
democracy clause, and justified its attitude early in 1997: 
"The existence of operative human rights and non-fulfilment provisions as 
proposed by the Community remains in Australia's view inappropriate in an 
Sir Leon Brittan, quoted in IP/97/572. 
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agreement on trade and cooperation .... no other industrialised country, including 
the US, Japan, Canada or New Zealand could accept the inclusion of operative 
human rights provisions of the type proposed by the Community in a framework 
cooperation agreement."231 
The Ambassador continued, that despite understanding that the Commission is bound to 
include a standard formulation in its agreements with third countries, the Australians had 
"recently been given to understand that it was not envisaged at that time that the 
Agreement would apply to countries such as Australia with which the EU and Member 
States share values and approaches." The Australians therefore suggested two 
alternatives to the framework cooperation agreement: the first being the conclusion of a 
less formal accord and a separate joint political statement, and the second being the return 
to Australia's original proposal, namely the conclusion of a joint declaration on political, 
trade and cooperation issues (based on the US and Canadian Trans-Atlantic dialogue 
model). 
The situation was further complicated by the indication of the European Parliament 
Committee on Human Rights, in the face of the continued failure to reach agreement on 
the human rights clause, that it would recommend that Parliament refuse to ratify the 
agreement i f the clause were not included.232 
Pressure on the Community to insist upon the inclusion of the clause also came from 
external sources during the negotiations, the General Secretary to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions speculated, "on the Australian Government's 
motivation in seeking to downgrade human rights in this way." 2 3 3 In addition, Aboriginal 
representatives voiced their concern, stating that "Australia should welcome with open 
arms such a clause rather than reject it ." They challenged the Government's argument 
2 3 1 Australian Ambassador in Brussels to the Member States, See Europe No 6901, of 27-28 January 1997, 
p.10. 
2 3 2 Europe No. 6903, of 30/01/97, pp.8-9. 
2 3 3 Press release, see Europe no .6898 Of 23/01/97, p.4bis. 
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that this matter should not be part of a trade agreement with reference to Australia's 
support for economic and trade sanctions against South Africa. At the heart of the matter 
was the Aboriginal groups concern for the rights of Australian indigenous people, 
particularly the growing controversy over the Government's plan to change the law 
relating to the right to claim native title. 2 3 4 
In June 1997, notwithstanding the realisation of fears relating to the Government's plans 
to amend native title law with the publication of the "ten point plan" in April 1997, the 
Council approved the draft Joint Declaration, to be concluded instead of a framework 
cooperation agreement.235 Despite criticism from some MEPs of what they viewed as an 
"a la carte" human rights policy, the joint declaration was accepted. Although Australia 
did not acquire all the trade concessions it was seeking, it is unlikely that the human 
rights clause negotiations had an impact upon that. Significantly, Hans Van Mierlo was 
explicit that "the decision to drop the human rights clause, would not serve as a precedent 
for ASEAN countries".236 
Mexico 
The outcome did not serve as a precedent for relations with Mexico, who also initially 
resisted the inclusion of the human rights and democracy clause in the framework 
cooperation agreement negotiated during 1996-97. Mexico had refused to allow the 
inclusion of the human rights and democracy clause in the previous framework 
agreement237 concluded in 1991, before the inclusion of the human rights clause had 
become mandatory. 
2 3 4 Europe No. 6905, 01/02/97, p.8. See Mick Dodson, "Linking Aboriginal Standards with contemporary 
concerns of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples", Sarah Pritchard 1998, for further details of 
concerns of these peoples 
2 3 5 Europe No. 6986, 02-03/06/97, p. 12. 
236 Financial Times 27/06/97. 
2 3 7 OJ L340/91. 
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In November 1996 Mexico proposed a two-stage approach to negotiations for a new 
agreement. The first stage would involve the negotiation of a Memorandum of 
Understanding setting the goals and fields of negotiations for a future trade agreement. 
Notably, this would not require a new agreement over trade and economic cooperation; 
instead, it would use the "future developments" clause of the 1991 Agreement. In 
practical terms this would have delayed negotiation of the human rights clause until the 
second stage, which would involve trade and political negotiations in the framework of 
the joint committee, set up under stage one. A global political, trade and cooperation 
agreement would be signed at the end of this second stage.238 
In March 1997 the European Commission informally responded to the Mexican proposal, 
proposing in turn a negotiating line for the cooperation and trade liberalisation 
agreement.239 This confirmed that the goal of the negotiations was to reach accord on a 
global agreement encompassing liberalisation of trade in goods and services as well as 
economic and political cooperation. To this end it proposed an interim agreement setting 
up a joint committee to negotiate matters falling within Community, as opposed to 
Member State, competence. This interim agreement would therefore require ratification 
only by the Mexican and European Parliaments, not by that of each Member State. 
Second, the EC, the Member States and Mexico would all sign a joint declaration 
undertaking to conduct trade negotiations on goods and services in the global context. 
Thirdly, liberalisation of trade in goods would only occur once the Council had decided 
the results of negotiations for these sectors. Although this proposal permitted a 
breakthrough in that less than three weeks later the Council agreed to the resumption of 
negotiations on this basis,240 it left several questions unanswered in relation to the human 
rights clause, including, notably, whether it would be included in both or only the final, 
global agreement. The Mexican Ambassador to the EU, Manuel Armandariz, recognised 
however, that whatever the intention in relation to this question, the Community was 
bound to include the clause in all such agreements stating: 
2 3 8 Europe No. 6859, 23/11/96, pp.8-9. 
2 3 9 Europe No. 6944, 28/03/97, p.7. 
2 4 0 Europe No. 6955, 16/04/97 p.5. 
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" I believe we could make good and fast progress, as after six months of semi-
official discussions we already know our respective positions well and we know 
where the difficulties lie." 2 4 1 
This was almost undoubtedly a reference to the terms of the inclusion of the human rights 
and democracy clause. However, notwithstanding that at one stage Mexico desired that it 
be included only in the global and not in the interim agreement, the difficulties 
encountered ultimately related not to the inclusion of the clause per se, but to its content. 
An agreement was reached in June 1997 which proposed to include the suspension 
mechanism in the Interim as well as the global agreement. This, however, was 
unacceptable to several Member States because the text of the standard clause was 
modified, allowing the annexation to the agreement of a declaration referring to the 
constitutional traditions of Mexican foreign policy. The concern voiced by Member 
States was that this did not refer to internal human rights protection. In the face of this 
protest the Mexican Government hastened to clarify its position through a statement by 
their Foreign Minister Jose Angel Gurria: 
"It is totally false that Mexico had wanted to avoid reference to "internal policies" 
in the democratic and human rights clause negotiated last week with the European 
Commission." 
He explained that Mexico had wanted the eight constitutional principles of its 
international policy to appear in the clause, but the Commission had refused that on legal 
grounds. Consequently any reference to internal and external policies had been erased. 
Notably three Member States as well as the Commission itself were satisfied that the 
contested clause was consistent with the spirit of the standard clause, comprising as it did 
both reference to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and a suspension 
2 4 1 Europe No. 6977, 20-21/05/97, pp.9-10. 
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mechanism in case of serious breach.242 Following Mexico's confirmation that the 
human rights clause applies also to internal policy, and acceptance of the terms of 
standard clause, both the Interim and Global agreements were finally initialled, with a 
declaration annexed to Article 1 of the agreements by Mexico referring to the 
constitutional principles of its international policy. 
Despite the agreement reached, further protest ensued from various human rights 
organisations, including Reporters sans Frontieres, Amnesty International, the Federation 
Internationale des Droits de l'Homme (FIDH) and Action des Chretiens pour l'abolition 
de la torture. These organisations desired tangible evidence of progress in the protection 
of human rights in Mexico, and that the EU should not be satisfied with Mexican 
rhetoric. Zedillo responded by accepting the existence of human rights violations in 
Mexico, but emphasised the importance of the progress which had been made and that 
such matters cannot be settled overnight.243 Both the interim and framework agreements 
were finally signed in December 1997,244 each including respect for democratic principles 
and fundamental human rights as an essential element. 
Comparisons Between the Australian and Mexican Negotiations 
It is interesting to make some comparisons between the series of negotiations described 
above. In order to do so however it is necessary to be aware of the internal background 
to the negotiations, particularly in Australia where the problem focuses upon that of 
Native Title. 2 4 5 
2 4 2 Europe No. 7000, 21/06/97, p.7b. 
2 4 3 Europe No. 7075, 09/10/97, p.2. 
2 4 4 IP/97/1086, 1997-12-08. For texts of the agreements see OJ 1997 C356 and C350. 
2 4 5 This is discussed in considerable detail, both because of its interest, and because it demonstrates the 
complexities in attempting to draw lines between different categories of rights and our understanding of 
states which uphold human rights standards. It also demonstrates the process by which international law 
develops, encompassing different rights within its understanding of standards to be protected. 
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This problem arose from the theory accepted by Australian Courts until 1992, that 
because it was "relevantly unoccupied", the Crown acquired a complete legal and 
equitable title to all lands in the colony when New South Wales was established.246 This 
assumption obviously denied the possibility of the existence of Native Title of the 
aboriginal people. However this theory was overturned in Mabo v. Queensland (No. 
2)247, in which the High Court held that the Crown's title was subject to native title which 
existed at the time of colonisation. 
Justice Brennan stated: 
" I f it were permissible in past centuries to keep the common law in step with 
international law, it is imperative in today's world that the common law should 
neither be, nor be seen to be, frozen in an age of racial discrimination. The fiction 
by which the rights and interests in land of indigenous inhabitants were treated as 
non-existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law 
of this country..." 
The High Court ruled that native title, as in full ownership, did not survive on any land 
held by freehold title but existed only on unalienated (Crown) land. This ruling led to 
both federal and State legislative action, resulting not unpredictably in incompatibilities 
between the two. This in turn led to further (High) Court action. In Western Australia v. 
Commonwealth™ the Court held that the Western Australian act, which had weakened 
the protection of Native Title and was in contravention of the Racial Discrimination Act, 
was invalid. However, following these two cases certain questions relating to Native 
Title remained unanswered. Of particular importance was the question of whether the 
existence of a pastoral lease would extinguish Native Title. This was the question before 
the High Court in Wik Peoples v. Queensland.249 It was widely assumed that although 
2 4 6 For a full discussion of this problem see Mason: "The Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Lands once part 
of the Dominions of the Crown " ICLQ 46 (1997) 812. 
247 Mabo v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
248 Western Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 183 CLR 373. 
249 Wik Peoples v. Queensland (1996) 141 ALR 129. 
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such a lease does not necessarily give the right to exclusive possession, it does contain 
the right to make improvements to property, and that the existence of such a lease would 
extinguish Native Title. The Court in Wik, however, confounded expectations by holding 
that Native Title could co-exist with a pastoral lease although it did emphasise that in the 
event of any conflict between the two, the pastoralist's (leaseholder's) right would 
prevail. 
Following the ruling in Western Australia, but before Wik had been decided, the (newly 
elected) Government undertook to reform certain elements of the Native Title Act, in 
particular reducing the right of indigenous peoples to negotiate on renewals or granting of 
certain kinds of lease, or development proposals. The proposals developed were to 
become known as the "Ten Point Plan". Although Aboriginal representatives as well as 
State Governments were to be consulted as the legislation was drawn up, there were 
certain legal considerations that could not be ignored. Fundamentally, Native Title is 
considered as a property right the extinction of which could constitute expropriation. 
This, being something which can only affect Aborigines, would constitute discrimination. 
Such discrimination would contravene Section 10(1) of the Racial Discrimination Act. 2 5 0 
Passions run high about native title. There are considerable interests at stake. While 
Pastoralists want native title to be extinguished, the Aborigines argue that the best way to 
treat native title is to negotiate regional agreements that recognise and guarantee the 
rights of both groups. The Miners however adopted a pragmatice stance, seeking access 
to the land to explore for (and extract) minerals without endangering improvements in 
relations with Aborigines which have been achieved. The Government described the Ten 
Point Plan: as a "Compromise when dealing with the competing interests of pastoralists, 
Aborigines and miners".251 The Ten Point Plan/Wik Amendments do not explicitly 
extinguish all native title but that is the effect in many cases. It makes it harder for 
Aborigines to claim their rights and in addition lays down a list of land titles which 
2 5 0 Section 10(1) confers on holders of traditional native title who are of a native ethnic group immunity 
from legislative interference with their enjoyment of their human right to own and inherit property. 
2 5 1 James Woodford, Sydney Morning Herald, 21/11/97. 
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automatically extinguish native title. The Wik Amendments remove any obstacles to 
governments who wish to provide, regulate and manage services, and permit the State 
Governments to extinguish native title on all the different types of leases that were 
granted with the intention of giving their owners exclusive possession of the land. This 
includes leases which were never taken up or have been abandoned or forfeited. 
The Federal Government was warned by its Chief General Counsel Henry Burmester in 
July 1997 that the Ten Point Plan may be racist, contravening the RDA on at least three 
grounds252 and potentially also breaching Australia's international obligations, notably 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination.253 It was also 
alleged to be unconstitutional because it was detrimental, rather than beneficial to 
Aborigines as required under the Constitution's races power. The Australian Law 
Reform Commission, in August, also advised that the plan was racist: describing it as 
"extraordinary, singular and discriminatory". This advice was consolidated in October 
1997 with the legal advice to Senate being almost unanimous (9/11) that the Wik Bil l 
breaches RDA and international human rights obligations. Internationally, the perception 
was little different: the shock of a South African all-party delegation to Canberra is 
summed up by the words of Wilem Odendall (National Party): 
"Mr Howard must seriously consider speaking to the indigenous people as an 
equal partner the Aborigines have the high ground all the way, and the 
Government can only lose, because Aboriginal rights are being taken away from 
them. He continued that whatever the Government's motives may be for the Wik 
Bil l "it's already being perceived over the world as racist, because Aboriginal 
people's rights have been taken away".254 
2 5 2 The three grounds being: the permanent extinction of native title on those leases granted with the 
intention of providing exclusive possession; the validation of leases granted after the enactment of the 
Native Title Act on the incorrect assumption that the granting of a pastoral lease extinguished native title; 
an increase in the rights of the pastoralist at the expense of native title holders. 
253 Sydney Morning Herald, 21/11/97. 
254 Sydney Morning Herald 21/12/97', reported by Margo Kingston. 
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As Mason observes: 
"Native land claims require a fair and principled resolution i f justice is to be done 
and racial harmony and co-operative co-existence between races are to be 
ensured. That is why it is essential that the task of resolving these claims justly 
must be undertaken in a spirit of goodwill and understanding."255 
Whatever the international perception, and regardless of the internal or international 
legality, the Australian Senate, having opposed the Amended Native Title Bi l l three 
times, finally passed the legislation, under Howard's threat to dissolve both houses of 
parliament.256 A hypothetical question, the answer to which can only be speculation, is 
whether the results of the negotiation with Australia would have been the same now, little 
more than a year on? The EC would have been dealing with a state which has legislation 
whose passage through Senate was dogged by allegations of racism, a perception shared 
by international opinion. Compounding the ethical questions that this would raise has 
been the economic collapse in Asia which can only have reduced Australia's strategic 
importance, which was certainly relevant to the negotiations. Legal challenges to the Act 
are sure to ensue, and indeed have already been threatened by Aboriginal representatives. 
It is significant, however, that the membership of the High Court has changed radically 
since Mabo (No.2)257 and Wik258, therefore no assumptions can be made about the 
outcome of such a challenge. 
Of course, it may be argued that such violations are not those that the Community has in 
mind in including the human rights clause in every agreement. The Australian Prime 
Minister certainly stated that for their part "the disagreement about the clause was not 
related to the Wik decision".259 It is likely that the Community intends only to be 
2 5 5 Mason, supra note 246 p.812. 
256 Financial Times, 09/07/98. 
257 Supra note 247. 
258 Supra note 249. 
2 5 9 Mason, supra note 246 at 827. 
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involved in cases where bodily integrity is at stake, but this is not clear from the terms of 
the standard clause in which reference is made to the UDHR. This distinction would also 
be difficult for the Community to sustain in view of statements it has made in relation to 
the protection of human rights. For example, in Com (97) 357 final, 2 6 0 the Community 
states clearly in chapter one Article 2; "The Community shall in particular support 
operations aimed at:....n) protecting indigenous people, their rights and cultures."261 
Internationally, concern is also growing for the rights of indigenous peoples. The UN 
Commission on Human Rights in 1997 authorised the continuation of the Working 
Group on a draft declaration on rights of indigenous peoples,262 and Erica-Irene Daes was 
named as a sub-commission special rapporteur on indigenous land rights and has been 
authorised to prepare a working paper on the subject.263 In view of this, i f the 
Community does not wish to consider such rights in the negotiation of its trade 
agreements, it would perhaps be wise to narrow the terms of reference to something more 
focussed on its intentions.264 
The human rights clause may, however, be of little practical importance: in July 1998 the 
EC J ruled that a fundamental change arising between partner states may give rise to a 
right to suspend cooperation.265 The Court based this ruling upon, upon the applicability 
in the Community of International law, Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, and upon 
the text of the preamble to the Agreement. In the joint declaration with Australia it is 
clear that human rights, as set out in international conventions, are to be upheld by both 
sides, and that this, while not constituting a suspension clause in itself, is fundamental to 
2 6 0 Proposed Regulation on the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
2 6 1 Chapter One deals with "Objectives and general principles of action to promote human rights and 
democratic principles." 
2 6 2 CHRRes. 1997/31. 
2 6 3 CHRDec. 1997/114. 
2 6 4 See also: COM (98) 146 final. 
2 6 5 Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co. and Hauptzollamt Mainz, Judgment of 16 June 1998. 
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the agreement reached. It is possible that the Australian legislation, i f it is indeed found 
to flout Australia's international commitments, may be sufficient to demonstrate a 
"fundamental change". I f this were found to be the case, and the Community can thus 
use international law to achieve its aims, it would be of little practical importance that the 
Community did not succeed in including an essential elements and suspension clause in 
the agreement. 
It may be argued, however, that in any case, it would be the Community's decision 
whether or not to suspend the (hypothetical) agreement. In a system where human rights 
protection relies largely on international observation, it is unlikely that a decision not to 
act would go unnoticed, particularly as there is no mechanism for third party enforcement 
in the case of a violation of the clause. Thus the least damage that would have been done 
is that the EC's credibility in this field would have been undermined. This being purely 
hypothetical it would be unwise to overstate the importance of these questions in this 
context. They do however demonstrate the difficulties which may well lie ahead for the 
EC with regard to the enforcement of this clause, difficulties which may well be outside 
its intended scope. 
Events following the conclusion of the Agreements with Mexico have raised different 
concerns. Just days after the agreements were signed 43 civilians were massacred in 
Acteal (Chiapas). This prompted an immediate statement of anger and of concern by the 
Luxembourg presidency. 
"...The Presidency of the EU .... calls upon the Mexican authorities to take the 
necessary measures to ensure the security of the civilian population in the state of 
Chiapas. In this context it should be remembered that the European Union and 
the US of Mexico have just signed a cooperation agreement under which both 
parties agree to respect the principles of democracy and basic human rights as 
well as principles of the rule of law." 2 6 6 
Europe, No. 7129, 29-30/12/97, p.2. PESC/97/121, 13666/97 (Presse 409) of 1998/01/27. 
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The Presidency also demanded that the Mexican Government discover who was 
responsible and bring the perpetrators to justice. It did, however, note the (Mexican) 
President's undertakings to this effect. 
In statements since then Mexican representatives have repeatedly reiterated their 
commitment to human rights and democracy267 and, significantly, progress has been 
made to resolve the long running conflict in Chiapas.268 This progress includes, 
paradoxically in the context of these two cases, a Bil l to protect Indigenous Rights and 
Culture.269 This is not to say that Mexico is developing a spotless record on human 
rights. Forty NGOs (including again FIDH and Amnesty International) together 
addressed MEPs requesting that they insist on "an operational and not purely formal 
content to the democratic clause of the agreement". It is significant that the Mexican 
Government has consistently refused to countenance any kind of international mediation 
in the resolution of the Chiapas conflict. There is, as the Mexican Governmental 
representatives themselves have observed, a long road ahead. It is apparently a road on 
which Mexico wil l not be accompanied, along any step of the way, by international 
observers, mediators or human rights groups. 
A potentially interesting development arising from the experience of these negotiations 
was the call by Belgium, and several other Member States, for a "general review of the 
human rights clause being included in EU cooperation agreements with third countries 
for the past several years, pointing out the difficulties encountered in this connection with 
Australia." It was suggested by Community sources that this review might take place 
during the Luxembourg Presidency.270 
2 6 7 See for example C/98/32, PRES/98/32, of 17/02/98, on the occasion of the Ministerial Meeting between 
the E U and Mexico, statement by Rosario Green, Mexican Secretary for Foreign Affairs, see also 
"Diplomatic Bag " "The Transatlantic Partnership of the Future " Update Mexico 4 (2) and statement by 
Jorge Madrazo, Mexican Attorney General, to the UN Human Rights Committee, 19/03/98, concerning 
progress Mexico has made towards better protection of human rights and reference to road which lies 
ahead. (Update Mexico, Diplomatic Bag 4(3) p.3). 
2 6 8 Europe No. 7193 02/04/98, p. 10. 
2 6 9 See Update Mexico 4 (3) for details. 
2 7 0 Europe No. 6999, 20/06/97, p.7b An extensive search of European Documentation for results of this 
proposed review has revealed only COM (97) 357 final and COM (97) 537. 
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Chapter 8 : Implementation of the Clause: The Community's Approach to the 
Protection of Human Rights and Democratic Principles 
It is outwith the scope of this work to assess the impact of the human rights and 
democracy clause in every agreement concluded or being negotiated by the EC and a 
third state. The outcome of negotiations involving the EC and two quite different states 
have been considered above. Perhaps the results were not entirely predictable. Possibly 
this is not of concern to the EC, as even the negotiations with Australia allowed a 
political statement to be made in support of these principles. However, political 
statement or not, these clauses have been used in recent years in the face of gross 
violations of human rights, to economic i f not necessarily political effect. 
The EC demonstrated its willingness to activate the non-execution clause with the 
suspension of development aid to Niger in 1996 as a response to the military coup which 
ousted the democratically elected President Ousmanem, replacing him with Colonel 
Mainassara. A more recent development relates to the presidential elections which took 
place in Togo in June 1998. Concerns regarding these elections reached such a level that 
the European Commission invited the Council to start proceedings which could lead to 
the suspension of the Lome Convention (Lome), in relation to Togo.271 The 
Commission's action was based on Article 366a of the revised Lome IV which lays down 
certain procedures to be followed and time limits to be adhered to, in response to a 
violation of the principles of Article 5 Lome (namely respect of human rights, the 
principles of democracy and the rule of law). This is a classic invocation of the non-
execution clause. Should the required consultations fail to reach a solution within one 
month, "appropriate measures" may be taken, including, as a last resort, the total or 
partial suspension of the agreement.272 The activation of this provision against Togo is 
notable in that it is the first time the Commission has proposed to the Council that Art. 
366a should be utilised. The Council is confirming that this provision is no empty 
1 Europe No. 7260, 10/07/98 p.8. 
2 Consultations took place on 30/07/98, see Europe 01/08/98. 
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rhetoric, but that the Community is standing by its commitment to human rights and 
democracy. 
In relation to Article 366a, it is interesting to note that the European Parliament 
(Parliament) in June (1998) requested to be consulted before Article 366a results in a 
suspension (or resumption) of cooperation.273 Leon Brittan, although acknowledging that 
Parliament should be more involved, pointed out the impossibility of formalising this 
under the current procedural conditions of this provision. He did, however, give an 
undertaking that Parliament would be kept informed of relevant developments and that 
the Commission would consider its suggestions.274 This followed the proposal by 
Parliament to the Council for a procedure to adopt "appropriate measures" in relation to 
non-respect of the human rights clause in the MEDA regulation.275 Parliament advised 
that such a decision should be taken by qualified majority. Unanimity was favoured by 
some Member States because they viewed such action as being essentially a political 
matter, and of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As decisions relating to 
CFSP are taken by unanimity, certain member states thought action should be taken only 
under equivalent procedural conditions. This is analogous to the argument of the 
Portuguese Government in Portugal v. Council.276 Had the Council decided that action 
should be only under unanimity it would have been somewhat paradoxical in terms of the 
consistency of approach to the external protection of human rights and democracy, unless 
the Community wished to suggest that its basis for action in this field is less than secure. 
This would question the utility and even the legitimacy of the inclusion of the clause. 
Having followed Parliament's advice on this question the Council, consistent with the 
procedure under Lome, did not allow for Parliament to have even a consultative role in 
any action to be taken. 
2 7 3 Following a parliamentary report on the draft Council Decision on the procedure for implementation of 
this Provision. 
""Europe No. 7244, 18/06/98 p.2. 
2 7 5 Parliamentary Report PE 225.326 fin, of 09/02/98, A4-0055/98. 
276 Supra note 216. 
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The developments in Togo come at a time when the Community is seeking to clarify both 
its action in relation to human rights and democracy violations in its partner states, and 
its approach to the protection of human rights and democracy in prospective partner 
states. This search for clarification has almost certainly been triggered in part by the 
problems encountered in negotiations with Australia and Mexico, and thereby responds 
to the Belgian call for a review of this policy. 2 7 7 
In July 1997 the Commission produced a proposal for a Council Regulation,278 the stated 
aim of which was: 
"to guarantee the consistency of Community measures to promote human rights 
and democratic principles .... ensuring that action is better attuned to the needs of 
partners and better coordinated with Member States' initiatives."279 
This Council Regulation, which would deal with procedures to implement aid and 
operations to promote human rights and democratic principles, has not yet come to 
fruition. It does however reflect a desire on the part of the Commission to consolidate its 
efforts in the external protection of human rights and democratic principles, and to bring 
an element of consistency and transparency to its action, which has until now been 
lacking. 
This proposal was followed by a Commission Communication, directed specifically 
towards the ACP States.280 This seeks, in the first place, to clarify the Community 
interpretation of the provisions of Lome IV relating to human rights and democracy. 
Secondly, it intends to raise consideration by these countries of the essential elements of 
the Lome Convention in the development of their internal policies, and thirdly it aims to 
promote discussion both in the Council and in the ACP States on the future of ACP-EC 
2 7 7 See text accompanying footnote 268. 
2 7 8 COM (97) 357 final. 
219Supra note 277, at 6. 
2 8 0 COM (98) 146 final. 
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relations. It is directed specifically towards the ACP countries because "the Lome 
Convention was the first to refer to human rights. This places it in the vanguard of 
efforts to take account of these fundamental principles in cooperation with non-member 
countries."281 
In particular the Commission is seeking to establish a consistent approach to its relations 
with developing countries. While doing this it places the emphasis on the need to 
consider the partner states' "social, economic, political and cultural circumstances" thus 
ensuring the Community some discretion in its action. This is supported by the emphasis 
placed upon use of the words "democratic principles" in Article 5 Lome, rather than 
democracy. Thus, the Community expressly does not require that all its partner states are 
already fully fledged democracies: 
"The concept of democratic principles also serves to accentuate the dynamic 
process leading to democracy. Democratisation is a gradual and ongoing process 
which must take account of a country's socio-economic and cultural context."282 
This Communication fulfils the intention of establishing a much needed framework of 
principles underpinning its action, while maintaining the discretion it realistically 
requires in order to be able to operate any kind of external policy in relation to human 
rights. However, the expression of the rights to be protected once again raises question 
marks over the consistency of the Community's approach, particularly in relation to 
cooperation with developed nations, such as Australia. The General Affairs Council has 
recently approved a Common Position complementing this Communication, which 
expresses the EU's "Wil l to work in partnership with civil society and African 
governments to promote respect for human rights, democratic principles, the Rule of Law 
and good governance in Africa." Again this common position emphasises the need to 
take specific conditions of different countries into consideration.283 Subsequently, the 
281 Supra note 278, Summary. 
282 Supra note 279, p.5. 
2 8 3 Europe No. 7229, 27/05/98 p.4. 
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Council has agreed a draft negotiating mandate for a replacement for Lome IV, which 
will expire in February 2000. Although Cuba has been granted observer status for these 
negotiations, its accession to Lome will be conditional upon "substantial progress" on 
human rights, good governance and political freedom.284 
The Community is clearly seeking evidence from its partners that, i f they are not already 
fully fledged democracies with clean human rights records, they are at least espousing 
principles which will bring them towards that condition. With this in mind the 
Community's approach is to bring any state, however unsavoury its human rights record 
may be, into dialogue. To exclude a country from international discussion and 
cooperation wil l not serve these aims well. In this the Council is clearly conforming to 
the Commission's approach. This policy has been clearly demonstrated in relation to 
China. In February 1998 the Council adopted a decision neither to sponsor nor co-
sponsor a resolution on human rights in China at the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
Furthermore, in the event that another delegation introduced such a Resolution, the EU 
Member States would oppose it. The EU in this context clearly prefers the approach of 
establishing dialogue and cooperation on human rights and democratic issues rather than 
imposing international exclusion. China has demonstrated willingness to address its 
policies by undertaking to sign the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although 
a further commitment concerning ratification has not yet been made. 
Human rights organisations are united in their criticism of this approach: Amnesty 
International's China Specialist expressed disappointment with the decision not to table 
or support a Resolution on human rights in China at the UN Human Rights Commission, 
believing that "Trade trumped human rights."285 Human Rights Watch has also expressly 
criticised this decision. The commitment to establishing and maintaining dialogue with 
China has led to criticisms of the EU and the suggestion that it is economic 
considerations rather than the desire to effectively address human rights abuses which 
Financial Times, 30/06/98. 
Financial Times 02/04/98. 
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have motivated this move.2 8 6 The result of the negotiations with Australia can only have 
encouraged such a belief. 
Unlike the result of the Australian negotiations, however, it remains out of the question 
that the EC would conclude a formal agreement with China without the inclusion of the 
Human Rights clause. This notwithstanding, in March the Commission produced a 
Communication: "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China"287 and 
considerable emphasis has been put upon cooperation aimed at bringing China into the 
WTO and the rest of the international community. This prospective integration is 
coupled with China's development towards "an open society based on the rule of law and 
respect of human rights." As Leon Britten emphasised in 1997 "Liberalisation of the 
economy deserves our support, but human rights also".288 He was speaking to the 
Parliament shortly after the EU failed to reach consensus on a Resolution on China at the 
UN Commission on Human Rights. He acknowledged that this failure was a weakness: 
the majority of states had been in favour of such a resolution at this stage. 
The extent to which economic considerations may be a factor among international 
players is impossible to guess. However, until the EC succeeds in establishing a 
consistent framework for its actions it will be all too easy to condemn. It is telling that 
the conclusion to the Commission Communication on partnership with China, opens with 
reference to "China's growing political and economic self-confidence .. as an incentive 
for the EU to engage the country more fully". 
The General Affairs Council adopted its conclusions to this Communication on 29 June 
1998.289 The five main aims of the new partnership agreed upon were virtually 
unchanged from those of the Commission Communication, although more emphasis is 
put upon the need for concrete improvements in China's human rights situation, 
286 Financial Times 02/04/98. 
2 8 7 COM (98) 181 final. 
2 8 8 Europe No. 6955 p.8. 
2 8 9 Europe Documents No. 2096, 02/07/98. 
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particularly with regard to Tibet. The EU Troika visited Tibet in Spring and returned 
disappointed at the levels of Chinese control over all their movements. This may have 
prompted the desire for concrete results. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusions 
The Community has demonstrated that in the context of development cooperation at least 
it is willing to implement the human rights and democracy clause. There is little evidence 
as to its impact on states which may commit human rights violations, but its greatest 
message is that it will be invoked. 
Outside the context of development cooperation the Community's competence to include 
the clause is less secure. Its enforcement would bring the economic interests of the 
Community into direct conflict with this admittedly political policy. The inclusion of the 
human rights and democracy clause certainly constitutes a common policy which in 
general terms does not come within the external competence of the Community. 
Although it is not within the commercial objectives of the Community, there has been too 
much economic emphasis in its implementation for it to be said to be strictly non-
commercial. It has been admitted to be political in its aims. In view of these factors it 
certainly overlaps with EU competence. Unlike the use of sanctions, which would be its 
closest comparison, there has been no adoption of a common position or joint action on 
which the Community could base its action since the early decision of the European 
Council (other than in relation to Africa 2 9 0) whose impact upon the Community was, at 
that time unclear. Certainly, i f the Community was bound by that decision, it violated its 
spirit in concluding the joint declaration with Australia. 
It is submitted however that human rights protection has always developed by attacking 
perceived ideas of jurisdiction and competence. I f this had not happened international 
law would still be locked into ideas of state sovereignty and sovereign jurisdiction, to the 
detriment of individuals. It is part and parcel of the development of international law to 
have such conflicting interests at stake. The Union/Community should however be able 
to resolve this problem and quite possibly Amsterdam is a step on the way. The 
Community has been becoming more politicised since SEA, and it would do no harm to 
acknowledge this externally. 
Common Position of 25 May 1998, OJ [1998] L158/1. 
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In the last year the Community has attempted to become more transparent and consistent 
in relation to this policy. Yet the root of the problem remains, both internally and 
externally, in the definition of human rights intended by the clause. It appears that the 
international human rights violations with which the Community is concerned relate to 
those rights not included in the Treaty of Rome, and not then considered as relevant to 
the operation of the Community. The development in understanding of human rights 
internally, and their extension to economic and social rights, has not been reflected by the 
Community externally. It is only natural that the Community be willing to protect 
different rights internally as opposed to externally. Not all human rights abuses can or 
should be treated in the same manner. Fundamentally they are not on the same scale, but 
this creates problems where the terminology used does not reflect these differences. 
There is a problem in using a wide legal mechanism in a universal manner to address 
human rights problems. The Community's search for transparency and consistency 
would be better served by initial clarity of definition. There are also political issues to be 
addressed: the resolution of human rights problems is not something that can be achieved 
instantly, or even with the same speed in every nation, this itself means that a uniform 
approach should not be taken. The key failing of the clause, is that it is too wide and too 
vague. It should be possible for the Community to achieve discretion and flexibility of 
approach, without leaving itself open to the criticisms arising from the current lack of 
clarity. 
The Community should also address the question of enforcement. It is not sufficient to 
point to the mechanisms in place i f there is no means by which the Community may be 
compelled to act. This lack assumes that the only relevant cases are those where the 
Community chooses to act. The Community may not choose to act in a case such as 
Australia, were the clause in place, yet a failure to act would be open to criticism. The 
fact that interested parties cannot bring an action is an unacceptable vacuum, 
notwithstanding the difficulties which would arise in defining such parties. To widen 
locus standi would heighten the need to define properly which rights are to be protected 
through the operation of this policy. 
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The Community may be quietly relieved that its cooperation with Australia cannot at this 
point be called into question in the way it might have been had Australia accepted the 
human rights clause, with its suspension mechanism. Australia has been vigorous in 
upholding human rights internationally, having been one of the nations who called for 
sanctions against South Africa. How it may feel, to be seen to be less ardent in dealing 
with its own internal human rights problems, may only be speculated upon. Howard 
stated that Australia's refusal to countenance the inclusion of this clause was not related 
to the Native Title problem. It is impossible to speculate, however, upon the effect on 
Australian Native Title Legislation had the clause been included, and the Community 
looked as i f it might enforce it. 
It is impossible to say what effect the pressure of the inclusion of this clause may have 
had on Mexico's policy in recent months. It was observed by Jorge Madrazo (Mexican 
Attorney General) in a statement to the UN Human Rights Committee that 
"it is paradoxical that some states still protest over Human Rights violations 
which take place in other countries while their own governments are clearly 
impervious to the progress of international law on human rights the great 
challenge facing the body of international law on human rights is to stop the over-
politicisation of the subject and stated the importance of making the transition 
from the empirical and political defence of human rights to their professional and 
technical protection."291 
It appears that the outcome of the negotiations between the EC and Australia on the one 
hand and the EC and Mexico on the other, exemplify the truth of this statement. But 
whether either state, or the Community, wil l recognise it in their actions is another 
question. 
The difficulties facing the Community in this policy are demonstrated by the question of 
the difference between the "Joint Declaration" between Australia and EU on the one hand 
and EU-China cooperation? The joint declaration approach was only accepted with 
2 9 1 Update Mexico, 4(3), p.3 "Respect for Human Rights in Mexico". 
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Australia because human rights were not perceived to be an issue. Following the 
decision in Portugal v. Council it would be impossible to conclude a development 
cooperation agreement with China, were this to be the appropriate framework. I f the 
Community develops its economic cooperation with China under circumstances in which 
it would be impossible to proceed under the development cooperation framework, it is 
laying itself open to allegations of hypocrisy. This returns to the Community's need to 
make this policy universal, and not limit it to development cooperation. However, it 
demonstrates equally the need for the Community to make its approach to different 
contexts transparent, or at least to clarify that different contexts wil l demand and receive 
different treatment, without abandoning the universality of its objectives. This need will 
become all the more acute, in relation to trade cooperation with nations with whom the 
basis of cooperation has not come up for renewal since the inclusion of these clauses 
became "mandatory". For such nations, with a questionable human rights or democracy 
record, it is crucial that the EC demonstrates that the inclusion of these clauses, is more 
than merely a political statement and that this commitment wi l l be acted upon in certain, 
extreme, cases, and that there is a basic consistency in its approach. This may be difficult 
while the EC maintains its special relationship with Turkey. However, it is in cases such 
as these that the politics of reciprocity and strategic importance come particularly into 
their own. As long as the door of cooperation remains open in this case, there is the 
potential for progress on these fronts. I f the door shuts there is a real danger of conflict in 
Europe. There will always be groups who point to "inconsistency" and therefore 
condemn the policy. I f the policy can be seen to have some effect however, it must be 
worthy of more than outright condemnation. 
The Community can certainly achieve more for human rights through economic than 
political pressure. It is possible however that the inclusion of the specific clause may be 
irrelevant. I f a violation of human rights, in an agreement such as that with Australia 
which refers to both parties' commitment to human rights in its preamble, can be 
interpreted as constituting a "fundamental change", international law may suffice to 
suspend cooperation. The clause nevertheless still serves the purpose of heightening 
international awareness. The importance of these clauses, as currently formulated, 
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outside the development cooperation context, thus lies in the culture they represent more 




Appendix A: Standard texts of the human rights and democracy clause and suspension 
clause 
Standard text of essential elements clause: 
"[RJespect for the democratic principles and human rights established by [the Helsinki 
Act and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe] [as well as the principles of Market 
economy] [as defined by the Bonn CSCE Conference] inspires the domestic and external 
policies of the Community and of [third country] and constitutes an essential element of 
this agreement." 
Complementary clause 
(i) Explicit Suspension ("Baltic") Clause 
"[T]he parties reserve the right to suspend this agreement in whole or in part with 
immediate effect i f a serious breach of its essential elements occurs" 
(ii) General Non-execution ("Bulgarian") clause 
" [ I ] f either party considers that the other party has failed to fu l f i l an obligation under this 
agreement, it may take appropriate measures. Before doing so, except in cases of special 
urgency, it shall supply the Association Council with all relevant information required for 
a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to 
the Parties. 
In the selection of measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the 
functioning of this Agreement. These measures shall be notified immediately to the 
Association Council and shall be the subject of consultations within the Association 
Council i f the other Party so requests." 
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